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LiberalEnvironmentalJurisprudence
INTRODUCTION

Perusal of virtually any environmental law textbook reveals confusion in the field. American environmental law is complex, messy,
and disorganized. Despite being a burgeoning area of practice,
environmental law is not a discipline, because it lacks the professional consensus on a coherent internal organization of materials a
discipline requires. The field's intellectual incoherence makes
teaching environmental law difficult, and gives rise to widespread
frustration among professors and students. Environmentalists are
also frustrated by a suspicion that academic environmental law's
incoherence detracts from the quality of legal and political discourse on the environment in the United States, thereby harming
the environment. This Article attempts to address these problems
by making environmental law coherent.
Section I of this Article documents both the frustration among
teachers of environmental law, and the lack of consensus as to what
environmental law is. As an academic enterprise, environmental
law rests on a well-established body of basic materials, the key statutes, cases, and articles that every environmental lawyer knows and
every casebook contains. Yet, the mass of materials is just that-a
mass. Environmental law has no explicit unifying principles that
could serve to organize the jumble of statutes, regulations, cases,
and academic analyses that collectively form the academic subject
of environmental law. Environmental law as currently taught does
not make sense, and this failing is the source of the common frustration with environmental law.
The core of this Article demonstrates that the basic materials of
environmental law can be organized into a coherent whole and
related to one another in a sensible fashion. Environmental law is
organized around three fundamental approaches to environmental
problems: (i) common law actions (tort, particularly nuisance); (ii)
the governmental aggregation of externalities whose harms are valued below the costs of their contractual resolution or judicial prosecution (administration); and (iii) the establishment of markets in
order to achieve societal ends (constructed markets, such as those
envisaged by the Clean Air Act).' Each approach to environmental
law has its weaknesses, and legal attempts to remedy those weaknesses have given rise to the next approach.
I Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7 4 01- 7 67 1q (1988 & Supp. 1992)).
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Understood successively, the three stages form an idealized history that conceptually organizes the materials of environmental law.
This history, at least in rudimentary form, has long been part of a
professional self-understanding. All environmental lawyers know
that environmental law has its roots in the common law rights of
action and occasional regulation of hazardous activities. Modem
environmental law is associated with the rise of an environmental
consciousness in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
The contemporary era of environmental law began with the great
statutes of the sixties and the seventies, and is being transformed by
the interpenetration of economic and legal techniques. But this
informal self-understanding of a profession does not adequately
organize environmental law. This Article attempts to make the
assumptions of the informal history explicit and to produce an
ideal history that would be capable of relating the materials of environmental law in a disciplined fashion.
This Article follows the same logical order as this idealized history. Section II demonstrates ways in which archaic environmental
law reveals the pervasive commitment to the basic rights of property
and contract, protected by a tort regime, that characterizes the
common law system. Section III discusses how classical environmental law recognizes market failure, and is therefore willing to use
governmental coercion to remedy failed markets. Section IV discusses how modem environmental law constructs markets in order
to accomplish the ends classically realized through regulatory interference with markets.' Section V of this Article makes the ideology
of the materials explicit, and generalizes the rough-and-ready liberalism on which liberal environmental jurisprudence rests. This Section then describes the contemporary challenge for liberal
environmental governance: to construct a grammar or meta-theory
for deciding among mechanisms of public choice that are legitimated by liberalism.
Section VI attempts to discern the limits of liberalism. Liberalism
is an unlikely creed for structuring environmental law because
there can be no political value in nature, which is "outside" political
participants. Environmentalism, by definition, looks outward to the
2 The notes reinforce the text's argument by citing materials which, if
printed, would form the skeleton of a casebook. While the notes do not
contain as many references as a thousand-page casebook, they should suffice
to demonstrate that the materials of standard casebooks, the elements of what
the profession recognizes as environmental law, fit into the schema presented
here.
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surrounding world, while liberalism looks inward. Environmental
law's ideal history thus reflects a sustained attempt by the legal community to square the circle, and phrase external concerns for the
environment in the politically efficacious, but internal, language of
liberalism.' Section VI of this Article also discusses attempts to
locate substantive value in nature and thereby to escape the constraints of liberalism through the doctrines of public trust and public nuisance, and the idea of intergenerational equity. These efforts
are ultimately unpersuasive because they do not meet the political
challenges posed by liberal ideology, challenges embedded in the
structure of most environmental law. To answer the political questions raised by the idea of substantive value in nature requires an
3 As this Article will argue, certain environmental concerns do not make
much sense to a thorough-going liberal because they do not protect individual
well-being. Laws like the Endangered Species Act, which contain an
expression of outward concern for the environment, rather than of inward
concern for the individual, can only be justified in procedural terms to the
liberal by reference to the legitimacy of the legislature- that passed the AcL See
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1988). Such law is
thus perpetually vulnerable to criticism, much of it from liberal
environmentalists who wish to see more rational use of the limited resources
available for environmental policies. See, e.g., Julie B. Bloch, Preserving
Biological Diversity in the United States: The Case for Moving to an Ecosystems
Approach to Protect the Nation's Biological Wealth, 10 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 175
(1992) (criticizing the Act as reactive and therefore ineffective); Charles Mann
& Mark Plummer, The Butterfly Problem, THE ATLANTic, Jan. 1992, at 47. The
Act has been challenged in court a great deal in recent years. See Victor M.
Sher, Travels With Strix: The Spotted Owl's Journey Through the Federal Courts, 14
PUB. LAND L. REv. 41 (1993); Ninth Circuit Environmental Review: Endangered
Species Act, 23 ENVTL. L. 1035, 1062-64 (1993). A currently fashionable attack
on the Act draws strength from the Fifth Amendment right to compensation
for takings of private property for public use. See, e.g., James S. Burling,
Property Rights, Endangered Species, Wetlands, and Other Critters-Is it Against
Nature to Payfor a Taking, 27 LAND & WATER L. REv. 309 (1992); cf. Alyson C.
Flournoy, Beyond the "Spotted Owl Problem": Learning from the Old-Growth
Controversy, 17 HARv. ENVrL. L. REV. 261 (1993) (discussing controversy in
terms of conflicts among values). But see Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered
Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interiorand Commerce,
64 U. COLO. L. REv. 277 (1993) (analyzing structure and defending both
purpose and efficacy of the Act). As I will discuss towards the close of this
Article, the problem raised for a liberal environmental law by the Endangered
Species Act is more profound than the conflicts of interest to which lawyers
are accustomed: the substantive arguments for preservation, and more
generally for the environment itself, cannot be made-therefore cannot be
weighed-within an environmental jurisprudence constrained by
contemporary liberalism.

(Vol. 27:619
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escape from the intellectual constraints of liberalism. No such philosophy is presently available to American politics.4 Future environmental law awaits a vision of human association more powerful than
the doctrinaire liberal political economy that currently informs and
limits environmental law.
Despite its theoretical limitations, however, liberal thought can
be deployed to organize environmental law. For liberals, liberal
environmental jurisprudence will justify today's law in terms of liberal personal political commitments. Even people who are not liberals can use liberal thought to render environmental law
comprehensible, thus enabling them to participate more effectively
in the debates surrounding environmental law. This Article hopes
to improve the quality of legal and political discourse concerning
the environment by making the materials of environmental law
cogent where possible. This Article will also anticipate environmental law's future by indicating the limitations of contemporary liberal
environmental thought.
I.

THE FETAL DISCIPLINE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw

Consideration of the environment engenders a sense of crisis.
The threat created by technological capability, familiar from the
arms race, is presented vividly by environmental degradation. Yet,
despite the high drama of the questions it raises, environmental law
itself is not considered exciting. Environmental law, whether in the
classroom or in practice, is not thought of as an opportunity for
contentious participation in the vital issues of our day. Instead,
environmental law is regarded as a barely manageable agglomeration of statutory and administrative trivia. As Professors Findley and
Farber explain:
On one level, environmental law appears to be a hodgepodge of
statutes, cases, and regulations dealing with matters as diverse as
automobile design, bottle deposits, and dam construction. Seen at

this level, the field changes so rapidly that meaningful analysis is
almost impossible.

At a much higher level, environmental law

presents broad problems of social policy which may be analyzed
4 There

is

no

end

of

philosophies,

some

of them

offered

by

environmentalists. A pragmatic jurisprudence such as the one I try to
construct, however, must be cognizant of political realities. Implicit in my
argument is my belief that, at least in the immediate future for which law

review articles are written, some fairly doctrinaire version of liberalism will be
the regnant ideology. This Article addresses its environmental concerns to

this sovereign.
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more usefully by economists and ecologists than by lawyers. At this
level, a unified treatment of the field is possible, but largely at the
expense of
5 those specifically legal problems which most interest
attorneys.
In response to this complexity, law professors frequently restrict
their scope of inquiry, presumably hoping to chart a happy middle
course through which problems of interest to lawyers and some resolution of issues can be found.
A book could, of course, try to give the student the illusion of
knowledge by offering a superficial and disconnected journey
through any number of topics in this vast field. We are convinced
that such an approach ultimately fails. It misleads the student into
thinking that environmental law can be practiced without the hard
work and sweat that practitioners know a statutory and regulatory
field requires. We have opted instead to treat some topics in
depth. 6

The success of this approach is unclear. The dean of American
environmental law professors, Joseph Sax, polled teachers of environmental law throughout the country to find whether restricting
the scope of inquiry, or any other method, made teaching environmental law an intellectually satisfying enterprise. The solid consensus among academics who had devoted large parts of their lives to
teaching environmental law was that their field was uncompelling at
7
best.

The usual reason given for the unsatisfying quality of environmental law (and of what is often regarded as its parent, administrative law) is that it is complicated. Scholars speak of environmental
& DANIEL FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: CASES AND
at xvii (1985). This statement is the first substantive text in the
entire casebook.
6 JOHN E. BONINE & THOMAS 0. McGAMRTv, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION at xx (1984).
5 ROGER FINDLEY

MATERIALS

7 Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law in the Law Schools: What We Teach and
How We Feel About It, 19 ENvm. L. REP. 10,251 (1989). Sax notes:

Virtually every law teacher-however broad his or her outlookwants to introduce students to the specific materials in the field,
and to provide some experience and familiarity with it. Yet, every
such attempt is an encounter with statutes of numbing complexity
and detail. My respondents did not find their unease markedly
alleviated when they shifted (as most had) from broad survey
courses to those that focused primarily on one illustrative statute,
usually the Clean Air Act.
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law as a tangled field, of its "bewildering variety"8 and "numbing
complexity and detail."9 Such statements are usually offered without support or further explanation, and anyone who has been
exposed to the FederalRegister is unlikely to challenge them.
These assertions may comport with the common view that human
life is growing more complex, a view associated with perceptions of
scientific and particularly technological progress. Upon reflection,
however, it is hardly obvious that the relationships between culture
and nature are inherently more complex than the arrangements
among the elements of society addressed by "ordinary" political and
legal language. How does environmental regulation implicate technology in ways that privacy rights, or intellectual property rights in a
computer age, do not? Constitutional debates over privacy and
even the arcane world of intellectual property law are not famous
for mind-numbing and overwhelming complexity. So why should
environmental law be considered uniquely hindered by the growth
of technology?
Equally obscure is the relationship between scientific knowledge
and legal articulation. Presumably, as more about the environment
is learned, regulating technologies that affect the environment
would become easier.1 ° Yet knowledge does not seem to make regulation any easier. Nobody believes that regulation is getting easier,
despite the growing store of information. 1 Moreover, other law
school courses dealing with law of mind-numbing complexity and
8 See BONINE & McGARrY, supra note 6, at xxi.

9 See ZYGMUNTJ.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND PoLicn. NATURE,
LAw, AND SociETY at xxviii (1992) (quoting Sax, supra note 7).
10 Hence the oft-heard remark that one should be an ecologist (or an
economist, or an engineer) in order to engage in environmental law. Such
arguments conceal a desire for political authority that cannot be assigned
appropriately (in democratic terms) or rationally to professional scientists.
11 Environmental regulations often have little to do with the type of
technology that generates the pollution. There is no tight fit between an
activity and its regulation, so the complexity of contemporary technology does
not explain the ennui of modern environmental law. Although a
manufacturing process for a particular product may be more complicated
today than the process that manufactured the same product yesterday, one
might choose a strict liability regime to regulate both processes. See cases cited
infra note 34 (providing examples of courts using strict liability in an
environmental context). On the other hand, it would be odd to maintain
there was no fit between an activity and its regulation. Some regulatory
techniques, such as setting the appropriate rate for an environmental tax, or
mandating use of a particular technology, may require a great deal of
knowledge about the regulated activity.
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statutory detail, such as tax, inspire a certain machismo rather than
despair. 12 After all, lawyers are paid for their ability to master complexity. In light of such considerations, some analysts have concluded that complexity cannot explain the unsatisfying quality of
environmental law.
Complexity as such does not seem to be the problem. Lawyers
enjoy puzzles. What discourages law teachers is rather a sense of
being drawn into a system in which enormous energy must be
expended on something that is ultimately vacuous. .. . "Environmental law has come to be a bore. . . if the idea is to 'teach' the

'law' that we find in the 'books.' There is too much junk there,

too many details ....
Project this picture a bit and what you have
for the future . . . is a bunch
of lawyers who don't really know
3

anything worth knowing."'

The outlook for the would-be textbook writer is grim. How can
one select and organize some of the 'junk" to teach an introductory
three-credit course to law students? The most common approach
devotes chapters to the great federal environmental statutes. 4 This
tactic commits the class to the media-specific approach Congress
has adopted for environmental regulation. Because environmental
statutes frequently use similar techniques to regulate different
media, a media-specific approach ensures classroom redundancy
and boredom. With the great statutes covered, supplemental chapters can be added on special topics, such as federal lands, takings,
and so forth, topics with no obvious connection to specifically environmental legislation. Sometimes texts include chapters concerning labor, agriculture, land use, energy policy, or health regulations
12

Rather than despair, one might become giddy. See William H. Rodgers,

Jr., A Superfund Trivia Test: A Comment on the Complexity of the Environmental
Laws, 22 ENvTL. L. 417 (1992) (providing a lighthearted look at the

complexity of environmental legislation). Rodgers's underlying point,
however, is serious. Complexity, even meaningless complexity, is a fact of life
in the world of environmental law. Such complexity threatens our ability to
have a meaningful environmental law, and one suspects, as fine an
environment as we might.
13
14

Sax, supra note 7, at 10,251 (quoting Professor Krier).
A somewhat different approach is to focus directly on the media. See

THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW: CASES, READINGS AND

(1985) (containing chapters on: land, waste and toxics; water pollution;
air quality and noise emission control). The media-specific approach to
TEXT

environmental policy is increasingly criticized for inducing polluters to simply
shift toxins away from a regulated medium to an unregulated one. See NIGEL
HAIGH & FRANCES IRWIN, INTEGRATED POLLUTION CONTROL IN EUROPE AND
NoRTH AMErICA

(1990).
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areas of governance that impinge on the environment writ large.

-

Each chapter may speak to thousands of pages of law. The student

is caught between the Scylla of superficiality surface -

and the Charybdis of minutiae

-

not scratching the

drowning in detail.

In the first "second generation" 5 environmental law textbook,
Environmental Law and Policy, Professor Zygmunt Plater and his coauthors use the structure of the legal system to organize environmental material.1 6 For the first time, an environmental law text-

book consciously adopts a societal, as opposed to environmental,
approach to structuring environmental law.17 This focus lends
some coherence to the material, and the book therefore merits its
reputation as an advance over prior environmental law textbooks.
Yet Environmental Law and Policy's coherence is more apparent
than real. The authors adopt the position of environmental plaintiffs. They note that "our approach will often be 'how can this problem be corrected within the legal system?' presuming in most cases
that a problem does exist.""8 In defense of their perspective, they
15 Joseph L. Sax, Foreword to Plater et al., supra note 9, at v.
16 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 9, at xxix.
In the face of the numbing mass and complexity of modern
environmental law, this coursebook uses the structure of the legal
system as its organizing principle, selecting the best examples of
how the process works, including a sampling of classic
environmental cases, without particular regard for the type of
pollution or policy involved. The way the legal system works, not
the intricacy of some media-specific physical science area, is our
primary concern. The book's larger organization, therefore, tries
to build around the major blocks of the legal system itself.
Id.
17 Indeed, a close reading of the table of contents reveals the three-stage
structure that this paper makes explicit. Part I provides a few preliminary
perspectives as an introduction. Part II is titled The FoundationofEnvironmental

Law: Traditional Common Law Theories and FundamentalIssues of Remedies and
Liabilities. Parts III and IV are titled, respectively, From Common Law to Public
Law: The Structure and Power of Government and Environmental Statutes and the
Administrative State: A Taxonomy of EnvironmentalStatutes. Each Part mirrors a

commitment of the environmental law regime to an element of the liberal
paradigm. Taken as a whole, the parts present most of the ideal history of
environmental law sketched in the Introduction to this essay and detailed
below. See PLATER ET AL., supra note 9, at vii-xxvi.
18 PLATER ET AL., supra note 9, at xxxv. "This approach seems realistic and
useful as well as defensible, however, because the doctrines of environmental
law have always been (and still are) developed primarily by the efforts of
citizen environmentalists." Id. The claim that citizen environmentalists play a

leading role in the development of environmental doctrine would not be
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point out that "[e] nvironmental defendants do not offer any similarly broad countervailing theory of environmental defense," 9 and
continue, in a footnote, "[1] egal defenses typically amount to a series
of attempts to avoid the issue. .- 2 As advocates, these authors
focus on environmental legal process. 2 '
Legal process may appear to be a comprehensive rubric under
which to unify environmental law. Yet important aspects of environmental law and policy escape traditional notions of process altogether. Alternative dispute resolution and international
environmental law, two legal regimes "outside" national legal
tenable outside the United States. Even in countries with advanced
environmental policies, such as Germany, access to courts and hence to the
formulation of doctrine, is limited. As a partial result, environmental politics
often take place in other, less legalistic, fora. For example, although much of
the environmental legislation in Europe emanates from Brussels, European
law has provided little opportunity for citizens to bring environmental suits.
Citizens only have the right to bring a complaint directly before
the Court of Justice under decisions or regulations addressed
directly to them. Since directives are addressed to the Member
States, no standing arises for citizens or citizen groups. However,
citizen groups have the right to appear before the Court, if the
Court agrees that the group has a legal interest in supporting the
case....
1 EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION at xxiii (1992) (General
Policy). Similarly, "[t] he Commission has a duty to bring cases of non-compliance, misuse, or misinterpretation of Community law before the Court ofJustice. . . ." REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES TO
THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (RIo DI

25 (June 1992). At European law, not just the enforcement but the
legal articulation, and hence development that the U.S. lawyer associates with
environmental litigation, is strictly a matter of inter-bureaucratic relations.
American lawyers have not been bashful about the virtues of litigation in envi-

JANIERO)

ronmental law. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Role of theJudiciamy in Environmen-

tal Protection, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 519 (1992).
19 PLATER ET AL., supra note 9, at xxxv.
20 Id. at xxxv n.4.
21 Plater himself has contributed significantly to environmental advocacy.
Also, much of the most technically interesting legal work of the last few
decades has been done by environmental plaintiffs. While these are two good
reasons to teach from the plaintiffs perspective, sophisticated advocacy and
jurisprudence are different things. This Article's criticism of the book is a
critique of completeness, which is always available and so of limited impact.
Environmental Law and Policy is an excellent casebook, and in parts it is
beautiful, a rare virtue in this context. I have consequently relied on it heavily
throughout this Article to illustrate the substance, as well as the deficiencies,
of contemporary environmental legal education and hence politics.
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regimes, are haphazardly appended to EnvironmentalLaw andPolicy.
Constructed markets, which do not fit easily within traditional
notions of the legal system,2 2 appear in a single, albeit well-written,
chapter. 3
More vitally, this focus on legal process can unify environmental
law only superficially, because there is no coherent set of legal
processes that produce outcomes affecting the environment. The
great mass of rules developed through administrative proceedings
are important in environmental regulation. But the administration
of environmental law also takes place through civil actions, statutory and constitutional interpretation, and even criminal proceedings. Legislative and community politics and the proprietary
activities of government also produce outcomes that affect the environment. Most importantly, activities affecting the environment
are usually organized through markets rather than through selfconscious governance. The legal process regards all these modes of
social organization as legitimate. Without benefit of theory, legal
process provides no way to resolve conflicts among various accepted
procedures. Environmental Law and Policy is openly biased in favor
of environmental plaintiffs. But is a bias sufficient to inform a
discipline?
Environmental Law and Policy coheres as a set of responses available to plaintiffs in a legal regime. The book thereby reflects,
rather than critiques or justifies, the commitments of the legal system. The book makes sense to a lawyer just as much, and just as
little, as law in general. This naive coherence, "presuming in most
cases a problem exists," obtained by structuring discussion around
the remedies afforded by law, suffices for advocacy in an adversarial
system. If Professor Plater et al. had set out to teach a course on
environmental litigation, this perspective would no doubt serve
them well. But by claiming to be about environmental policy, the
book implicitly asserts that legal education concerns questions of
legislation, which include the making of law, not just advocacy
under the law. The educational program implicit in Environmental
Law and Policy requires a thorough-going environmental jurisprudence which the book does not provide. A philosophically modest
approach such as "presuming a problem exists" cannot suffice for
the education of an environmental legislator, who must consider
22 Constructed markets explicitly conflate the state and civil society, that
modem political theory, and hence law, has traditionally held asunder.
23 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 9, at 860-81.
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what the appropriate ends of environmental legislation are. Environmental Law and Policy is like a book on justice written by the
prosecution.2 4
Designing an environmental jurisprudence is a practical as well as
a speculative undertaking. Like the jurisprudence of any doctrinally developed field of law, environmental jurisprudence should
be able to critique, rationalize, justify, and generally account for the
legal materials of environmental law. Moreover, the basic texts
should reveal the deep commitments of environmental law. When
made explicit, these commitments should form the heart of a selfconscious environmental jurisprudence. This Article now turns to
the classic texts of environmental law-the things every environmental lawyer has read-in an attempt to discern the assumptions
on which must rest environmental jurisprudence, and hence the
internal coherence of environmental law.
II.

A.

ARcHAIc ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: TORT

Mediated Harms: Proxiesfor Environmental Concerns

Environmental law can be divided into three stages: tort, administration, and constructed markets. Although the impact of constructed markets has yet to be fully realized, the earlier part of this
history has long been a part of the informal self-understanding of
environmental law. As Professors John Bonine and Thomas

McGarity note:
The early origins of environmental law can be traced from private
tort and trespass remedies at common law to government control
over coal burning in the sixteenth century and regulation of sewage disposal in the nineteenth century. By the early 1900's, pioneering legislation set aside national parks and governed timber
and mining activities. The concept of environmental law matured
with the development of administrative law and judicial review of
government actions since the 1930's. Various statutes enacted
throughout the twentieth century tried to extend protections in
24 The authors of Environmental Law and Policy are aware
that
environmentalists have produced several ethics and a great deal of advocacy,
but no environmental theory of law. As noted, supra note 18, theyjustify their
plaintiff's perspective not in terms of a legal theory, but by pointing out that
environmental defendants have not "produced a broad countervailing theory"
of environmental law. PLATER ET A.., supra note 9, at xxxv. Simply asserting
the intellectual poverty of one's opponents, and the ad hoc character of
defenses to environmental claims, does nothing to provide environmental
legislators with a theory sufficient for the wise articulation of environmental
politics.
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different ways. The modem era
2 5 of environmental law, however,
began at the end of the 1960's.

Though this informal history supports the idea that environmental
law can be divided into stages, it also raises many questions. What
makes a law environmental? Is it enough that the law affects the
environment? (What does not affect the environment?) Why are
26
the common law rights, collectively referred to here as tort, first?
What separates private remedies from government administration?
What justifies the loose categories delineated in the passage?
Plater et al. refer to the common law as "the foundation of environmental law."2 7 In a sense, the statement is historical. The common law rights of action are very old, and the Anglo-American legal
tradition has long understood itself through common law development. In this traditional view, the ancient rights of Englishmen are
the basis of all law, including environmental law. The legal process
approach to environmental law naturally includes the fundamental
relationship between human activity and its environment in the
very foundation of Anglo-American law, the common law system.
Of the common law causes of action, nuisance is the most obviously environmental, and yet a nuisance claim's environmental
character is only implicit. Nuisance is defined generally in terms of
the use of property in a manner that obstructs another's free use
and enjoyment of property. Nuisance is an invasion of rights, a
tort. Many nuisances might also be characterized as harmful to the
environment. For example, many nuisances concern noxious gases
and smells. 28 Nuisances may also be characterized socially as
25 BONINE & McGAmaY, supra note 6, at xx.

The passage raises other

questions: What is the relationship of administration to private tort and
trespass remedies? What distinguished government legislation before and
after 1900? What defines "the modem era" of environmental law? Id.
26 See also WiLLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
100 (1977):
The deepest doctrinal roots of modem environmental law are

found in principles of nuisance. The infinite variety of wrongs
covered by this amorphous theory is well known to any student of
the law, but deserves emphasis here ....

Nuisance theory and

case law is the common law backbone of modem environmental
and energy law.
Id.
27 PLATER ET AL., supra note 9, at 101.
28

See, e.g., Morgan v. High Penn. Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 686 (N.C. 1953).
The evidence of the plaintiffs tended to show... the oil refinery
emitted nauseating gases and odors in great quantities; that the
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annoyances of other people. However, nuisances are defined
legally in terms of individual rights, not environmental or social
concerns. Nuisance cases do not declare activities illegal simply
because they burden the environment, or even because they bother
the neighbors. For example, the court in FontainebleauHotel Corp. v.
Forty-five Twenty-five Inc. held that the action of nuisance was limited
by the sphere of individual right.
This maxim [sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas] does not mean that
one must never use his own property in such a way as to do any
injury to his neighbor. It means only that one must use his property so as not to injure the lawful rights of another ....

[I]twas

stated that "it is well settled that a property owner may put his own
property to any reasonable and lawful use, so long as he does not
thereby deprive the adjoining landowner of any right of enjoyment
of his property which is recognized and protected by law, and so29long as
his use is not such a one as the law will pronounce a nuisance."

Nuisance regulates mediated harms, in which the environment
figures indirectly as the medium through which the harm passes."0
For environmentalists and aggrieved neighbors, the attention
devoted to infractions of rights may seem beside the point. From
nauseating gases and odors invaded [various properties] in such
amounts and in such densities as to render persons of ordinary
sensitiveness uncomfortable and sick; that the operation of the oil
refinery thus substantially impaired the use and enjoyment of the
nine acres by the plaintiffs ....
Id.

29 Fountainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So.2d
357, 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), cert. denied, 117 So.2d 842 (Fla. 1960)
(citations omitted); see also Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982)
(reaching an opposite result using same framework).
30 Even the classic case Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870
(N.Y. 1970), is not an unabashedly environmental case. In Boomer, the court
held that the defendants should pay past, present, and future damages to the
plaintiffs rather than abate their nuisance, thereby purchasing a private
condemnation. The opinion emphasized the parties' rights, the victim's
damages, the activity's contribution to the coffers of the community, the
effects of various remedies, and other traditional concerns of the common
law. The environment in Boomer figured as a legitimate independent concern
only for legislatures. As the court noted:
A court should not try to do this [ameliorate air pollution due to
the manufacture of concrete] on its own as a by-product of private
litigation and it seems manifest that the judicial establishment is
*neither equipped in the limited nature of any judgment it can
pronounce nor prepared to lay down and implement an effective
policy for the elimination of air pollution.
Id. at 871.
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the perspective of the legal system, however, there are good reasons
to limit nuisance law to redressing legal harms. Otherwise, complete solicitude for the environment, or extremely sensitive neighbors, would make any activity illegal. In practice, a nuisance
doctrine that afforded a remedy against every injury to the environment, or for every bothered neighbor, would allow unbounded
judicial discretion. Therefore, nuisance law protects only the
rights, not the person, of the neighbor. In so doing, courts make
the environment extraneous to the judgment of nuisance cases.
The environment may be present in torts other than nuisance.
In a familiar example, Rylands v. Fletcher, a mining operation
flooded an adjacent mine. The court held the mining operation
strictly liable for damages resulting from using land in an abnormal
fashion."1 The question used to establish this standard was implicitly environmental: What was the normal use of the land in question? Certain places are inappropriate for certain activities. The
analogies in Rylands to escaping cattle, fumes, or fire3 2 or breaking
horses in Lincoln's Inn Field,33 were also environmental in some
sense.
Yet, this environmental concern for place can be translated into
terms that safeguard individual economic rights. People in the
farmland around the mine in Rylands have a reasonable expectation that they will not be subject to the depredations of domestic
animals, fire, or inundation. If that expectation is disappointed,
they have a right to monetary compensation. This reasonable
expectation, then, is what the law protects in establishing strict liability standards for those who persist in conducting "unnatural"
activities.3 4
31 Rylands v. Fletcher, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), affd, 19 L.T.R. 220
(1868). See in particular the opinion of Cairns, Lord Chancellor, 19 L.T.R. at
221-22.
32 See Fletcher v. Rylands, 13 L.T.R. 121, 124-25 (1866) (Bramwell, B.)
(focusing on fact that plaintiff was damaged on his own property, and
therefore had assumed no risk).
33 See Mitchell v. Allestry, 86 Eng. Rep. 190 (1676), reprinted inJ.H. BAKER &
S.F.C. MILSOM, SOURCES or ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY. PRIVATE LAW TO 1750, at
572 (1986).
34 For a relatively recent use of the Rylands strict liability rationale in an

environmental context, see Branch v. Western Petroleum, 657 P.2d 267 (Utah
1982). See also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984). Silkwood is
usually read against Pacific Gas and Elec. v. State Energy Resources Cons. &
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983), on the question of federal preemption of
common law. However, the trial court in Silkwood applied the strict liability

1994]

Liberal EnvironmentalJurisprudence

635

Courts continue to insist that environmental harms be phrased as
invasions of an individual's rights.3 5 In Sierra Club v. Morton,"6 the
Supreme Court held that plaintiffs in environmental cases must
allege some injury in fact to have standing to sue. The analysis contained two parts. First, the injury must involve a "cognizable interest." That interest need not be monetary. The Court included
aesthetic values or values besides simple economic loss. 7 Second,
the injury must be to the plaintiff.3 "
rationale from Rylands and awarded damages in a case involving the
maintenance of a nuclear power plant. The decision was ultimately upheld by
the Supreme Court. For a brilliant closing argument, illustrating the loose fit
between the legal articulation of governance, here tort liability, and the
regulated activity, see Gerald L. Spence, Closing Argument in Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee (May 14, 1979), in ROBERT M. COVER ET AL., PROCEDURE 990
(1988).
35 Not so long ago, it appeared in some quarters that litigation could, and
indeed should, be a mode of explicitly public discourse. See Abram Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281 (1976);
Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L.
REv. 4 (1982) (modifying earlier enthusiasm in light of the retrenchment of
the Burger Court). Chayes' fundamental point, however, stands, and is an
important counterpoint to the analysis I employ:
It is more accurate or at least more helpful, I believe, to think of
the courts [in cases involving review of administrative action] as
institutions exercising an oversight function on behalf of the
interests and groups as well as the individuals affected by the
challenged bureaucratic actions. . . . For in the contemporary
administrative state, bureaucratic actions do not necessarily bear a
stamp of legitimacy as outcomes of democratic process.
Chayes, Foreword:Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, supra,at 60. I agree,
but this insight belongs in a later stage of the account offered here. See infra
note 97-105 and accompanying text (discussing government's relationship
with civil society, and the relationship among the organs of government).
36 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
37 Id. at 734. "We do not question that this type of harm may amount to an
'injury in fact' sufficient to lay the basis for standing under Section 10 of the
APA [Administrative Procedure Act]. Aesthetic and environmental well-being,
like economic well being, are important ingredients of the quality of life. .
Id.
38 Id. at 735. "But the 'injury in fact' test requires more than an injury to a
cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among
the injured." Id. at 734-35. See also Christopher Stone's famous article, Should
Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV.
450 (1972) [hereafter Toward Legal Rights], which became a book, SHOULD
TREES H-AVE STANDING? (1972). In his Sierra Club v. Morton dissent, Justice
Douglas adopts the fundamentals of Stone's position. Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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The Court did not define cognizable interests. It stated only that
an interest need not be economic in order to be cognizable. However, the requirement that the plaintiff be injured helps illuminate
the first requirement that the plaintiff have a cognizable interest.
An interest that does not concern the individual is not an injury in
fact, because it fails the second prong of the test. So here, the
plaintiffs' frustrated interest in a valley's environment that plaintiffs
did not claim to enjoy personally, failed to amount to an injury in
fact. If an interest passes the second prong of the test, then it is-at
least plausibly-an interest internal to the plaintiff. The plaintiffnot Mineral King Valley, not the environment-is the locus of
harm. 39 Implicitly, the Court defined cognizable interest as a private interest. Sierra Club v. Morton ultimately asserts an economic
view of harm as the frustration of private interests held by an
individual.
The attention to individual harms in Sierra Club v. Morton recalls
the foregoing discussion of environmental nuisance. Under nuisance law, the plaintiff's harm cannot merely be asserted but must
also be formalized and rendered legally authoritative. In nuisance
law, harms are justiciable if they involve infraction of a plaintiff's
rights. For standing, certain harms are easily cognizable, most notably economic harms. Yet, as the Sierra Club v. Morton Court states,
economic harms do not comprise all the environmental harms that
a court should recognize. So what separates worthy from trivial
claims? The solution to this problem in nuisance cases is that worthy cases involve the invasion of a sphere of autonomy protected by
individual rights. But this solution does not work here. To allow
standing only where rights are well established would greatly hinder
the new litigation necessary to provide detail for a developing area
of law such as environmental law. In Sierra Club v. Morton, the Court
did not need to define cognizable harm because plaintiffs failed to
allege they were injured. Nonetheless, the Court made a roughand-ready distinction: worthy claims exist when the plaintiffs stand
to lose an environmental commodity they had hitherto enjoyed.4 °
39 At this point, the litigation becomes too fictional for some tastes. See
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 741-52 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 755-60
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Toward Legal Rights, supra note 38, at 466
(maintaining that Sierra Club v. Morton litigation about environment, not
restrictions on members' recreational opportunities).
40 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 735.
The impact of the proposed changes in the environment of
Mineral King will not fall indiscriminately upon every citizen. The
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The Sierra Club v. Morton Court virtually instructs the plaintiffs to
amend their complaint and allege that they use the valley in a "way
that would be significantly affected by the proposed actions of the
respondents." 4 1 A year later, in United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP 1)42 the Court made this standard explicit.4" Sierra Club v. Morton and SCRAP I employ the
notion of "use" to blur the two requirements of the injury-in-fact
test. If plaintiff's use has been restricted, then the injury requirement has been established. But at the same time, the use requirement ensures that the cognizable interest also required for injuryin-fact is understood within the conceptual parameters of the common law system, that is, as an injury experienced by an individual.
The building of a resort; or the changing of rail rates, restricted the
sphere of action enjoyed by the plaintiffs, specifically their liberty to
use certain land for recreational purposes. More generally, adjudication translates environmental questions into conflicts among the
interests of various members of society. Injury to the environment
is thus ultimately understood, in both the nuisance and the standing cases, as a limitation of individual freedom.4 4
alleged injury will be felt directly only by those who use Mineral
King and Sequoia National Park, and for whom the aesthetic and
recreational values of the area will be lessened by the highway and
ski resort.
Id.
41
42
43

Id.
412 U.S. 669 (1973).
Id. at 684-85. As the Court noted:

The appellees respond that unlike the petitioner in Sierra Club v.
Morton, their pleadings sufficiently alleged that they were
"adversely affected" or "aggrieved" within the meaning of § 10 of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),.5 U.S.C. § 702, and they
point specifically to the allegations that their members used the
forests, streams, mountains, and other resources in the
Washington metropolitan area for camping, hiking, fishing, and
sightseeing, and that this use was disturbed by the adverse
environmental impact caused by the nonuse of recyclable goods
brought about by a rate increase on those commodities.
Id.

44 As discussed in the next Section, the limitations on freedom that
standing requires may be too occasional to be adequately addressed by a
regime of rights vindicated in court. Since Sierra Club v. Morton, the Supreme
Court has continued to use standing to require that environmental litigation
be phrased in terms of individual rights. Indeed, the emphasis of the Court
on the individual, as opposed to the environment, has deepened over the
years. SeeLujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992); Lujan v. Nat'l
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The Birth of Environmental Law and the Maturation of Tort

Common law adjudication protects a pre-existing system of
rights, that is, an orderly delineation of particular social relations
among individuals.4 5 An action in tort is a plea for judicial restoration of the system of rights that the plaintiff alleges has been disturbed by defendant's tortious action. Environmental law-as
opposed to law with environmental effects-arises when the legal
system restores the natural order, not the social order.4 6 Archaic
environmental law harks back to a natural order disturbed by
human agency and attempts to restore that order through legal
action. As discussed in the last Section, the legal effort to restore
the natural order requires phrasing the natural order in terms of
individual legal rights and freedoms. In archaic environmental law,
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); see also Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing as an EssentialElement of the Separation of Powers, 17 SuFFOLK U. L. REV.
881 (1983). For a critique of Scalia's jurisprudence on environmental
standing, see Patti A. Meeks, Justice Scalia and the Demise of Environmental Law
Standing, 8J. LAND USE & ENvrL. L. 343 (1993).
45 This protection extends to relations between the individual and the
state, and to the state's own configuration, as stoutly maintained by Coke in
his controversy with King James I. See Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638
(1610); Case of Prohibitions del Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342 (1608). The
relationship between the individual and the state assumed by environmental
law is discussed in terms of administration.
46 See FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW
AND POLICY at xxiii (1984) ("Until the late 1960s what we now call
environmental law did not exist; the term was first used in 1969."). This text
also notes:
The first suggestion that a body of law might be built around the
duty to consider nondevelopmental values was the Second
Circuit's opinion in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom.,
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), which remanded a hydroelectric
power license for a pumped storage project because the FPC had
failed to consider adequately the project's impact on scenic values
and on fish and wildlife.
Id. at xxiii; see also id. at 70 (calling Scenic Hudson "the litigation that provided
the first theoretical underpinning for environmental law.").
Legal academe seems to have been aware of the emergence of a new area of

law. See A. Dan Tarlock, Current Trends in the Development of an Environmental
Curriculum, in LAw AND THE ENVIRONMENT 297 (Malcolm F. Baldwin &James

K. Page, Jr. eds., 1970); Harrison C. Dunning, Notes for an Environmental Law
Course, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 804 (1970); Frances Irwin, The Law School and the
Environment, 12 NAT. REsoURCESJ. 278 (1972).
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the environment can only be represented by the proxy rights and
interests of individuals.
Today, common law adjudication is used to further the ends of
each stage of environmental law: archaic, classical, and modem. In
archaic environmental law, the tort regime has been deployed to
deal with large-scale damage caused by industry. 47 Innovative
approaches to financing, discovery, proof, and damages have made
tort law applicable to a range of previously unregulated
problems.
48
This includes a variety of environmental problems.
Classically, courts used tort concepts to complement environmental regulation. In 1971, Professor Frank Michelman observed:
47 Since archaic environmental law rests on the non-environmental
conceptual apparatus of common law, the new field of toxic torts uses
doctrine largely developed for substantively different problems. A revolution
has occurred in showing causation that is critical to the adjudication of diffuse
environmental harms. See Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (holding that plaintiff in a DES case could
hold drug manufacturer liable upon showing that manufacturer produced
substantial percentage of drug in marketplace); Charles Nesson, Agent Orange
Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontier of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REV. 521
(1986); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
"Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HAv. L. REv. 849 (1984).
Many of the mass exposure cases are environmental in some sense, though
they are usually treated as expansions of traditional tort concepts. As this
Section argues, even explicitly environmental law is only tangentially
environmental. Certain cases that might plausibly be viewed in terms of the
environment often are not. See Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D.
Utah 1984), rev'd, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), and cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1004 (1988) (regarding exposure to radioactive fallout from weapons testing);
Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466 (N.J. 1986) (regarding
asbestos); PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DIsAsTERs
IN THE CouRTs (1987) (summarizing Agent Orange cases involving exposure
of Vietnam War veterans to chemical defoliant).
An analytical distinction (perhaps with legal ramifications) needs to be
maintained between an implicitly environmental aspect of the mass exposure
cases and cases that rely on environmental regulation to establish liability. See
Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1993)
(attempting to develop a jurisprudence for environmental torts, narrowly
construed); see also Jeffrey Trauberman, Statutory Reform of "Toxic Torts:
Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REv. 177 (1983).
48 See, e.g., Anderson v. Beatrice Foods, 900 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 891 (1990) (discussing causation problems); Ayers v. Jackson
Township, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987) (discussing damages questions); PHIL
BROWN & EDWIN J. MIKIELSEN, No SAnE PLACE 110-11 (1990) (discussing
Beatrice Foods).
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There is now abroad in the land a lively interest in viewing private
lawsuits as an important component of any system of air-pollution
control law. More specifically, there is great interest in using privately-initiated nuisance litigation, perhaps with some
49 modification
of the common law doctrines, in such a manner.
Virtually all the classical environmental statutes use archaic environmental law by creating causes of action for injunctive relief, damages, or both.5" Civil claims in environmental statutes serve two
functions. First, as Michelman indicated, the causes of action may
complement statutory law as a federal "nuisance law," so that plaintiffs can bring environmental claims as both a nuisance and a violation of federal statute. This offers plaintiffs more flexibility than if
they sued under common law, which could restrict plaintiffs to state
law under the Erie doctrine.5 1 In addition, some federal statutes
49 Frank I. Michelman, Pollution As a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on
Calabresi'sCosts, 80 YALE L.J. 647, 666 (1971); see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas

Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the

Cathedra4 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972) (discussing use of nuisance litigation);
see also Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972)
(using nuisance litigation to combat odorous cattle operation).
50 See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (1988); Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (1988); Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-11, 1231-38 (1988); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); Marine Protection, Research,
and Sanctions Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1415; Public Health Service Act, 42
U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1988); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972; Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. 1992); Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (1988); Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11046.
Interestingly, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-70, establishes no private cause of action, nor does it expressly
give Article III courts substantive review powers. Section 102 was read as
legally enforceable from the beginning, however, because it patently
established a legal duty. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United
States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Although the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1988), provides for
citizen suit challenges to agency procedures, the courts have read Section 102
more broadly than the APA's citizen suit procedures.
51 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Much environmental law
is federal statutory law, and yet its structure and many of its claims are based
on the common law, which is state law. The "modification of the common law
doctrines" lightly referred to by Michelman thus raises a procedural problem
for American law. In Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (Milwaukee I1),
the Supreme Court held that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, as amended by the Clean Water Act, had pre-empted
federal common law. In Illinois v. Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985) (Milwaukee III), a state common law claim was
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support plaintiffs' suits by providing resources not usually available
to the common law litigant, including lowering litigation's risks
through fee shifting and increasing
plaintiffs' odds by providing
52
governmental research results.
The second function statutory causes of action serve is enforcement through a system of private attorneys general.53 The procedural resources of civil litigation are mobilized in defense of the
denied because the court found the claim pre-empted by the comprehensive
legislative scheme of the Clean Water Act. But see supra note 34 (discussing
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984)). For still more on the
vexed relation between common law and federal law, see International Paper
Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
52 For example,
The emphasis of the Superfund program on demonstrable
dangers to health ties it back closely to tort law.... Of course,
where there has been demonstrable damage to health, there has
always been the possibility of tort actions, but Superfund injects
the resources of the government into developing the facts on
which tort cases can be developed.
Angus Macbeth, Superfund: Impact on Environmental Litigation, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW (ABA Standing Committee on Environmental Law), Winter 1982-83, at 6.
Macbeth continues:
The Hooker cases bring that point home as well. In its litigation
against the government, Hooker sought a protective order aimed
at maintaining the confidential character of materials it turned
over to the government. The motion was denied, the judge ruling
that the claim that disclosing discovery materials would unquestionably be detrimental to Hooker in the parallel private suits was
not good grounds for granting the order. In other words, the private plaintiffs can "ride piggyback" on the government's discovery.
In short, Superfund actions, particularly where the government is
put to the effort of substantial factual development, increase the
likelihood of tort actions if the facts are there to make a respectable claim.
Id.
53

It has been argued that the universal civil claims clause of the Clean Air

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. 1992), which grants "any person" the right to
bring a claim, is a legislative attempt to offer universal standing.
The constitutional policy of checks and balances that underlies
judicial review, however, can be said to argue in favor of a
construction of "case" and "controversy" that would permit
Congress to extend standing beyond the injured. .

.

.When the

harm is widespread and individually small, however, as is often
true in pollution cases, it may be that no victim will find it worth
the cost to sue. There is even the possibility in some
environmental situations that no one is injured in the Sierra Club
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regulatory regime. Private suits also provide political benefits by
decentralizing the enforcement process, making the system more
resistant to regulatory capture. The statutes give private plaintiffs
(individuals and non-governmental organizations) rights both to
enjoin private parties from committing prohibited actions, and to
compel governmental agencies to perform their statutory duties.
Environmental statutes thus use the relative incorrigibility of the
court system and the stamina of environmental activists to remedy
the problems of bureaucratic inertia and regulatory capture which
plague administrative law.54
The RCRA/CERCLA regime for hazardous waste management
exemplifies the use of tort in the modem, as well as in the archaic
and the classical stages of environmental law.5 5 Under this regime,
tort liability not only provides traditional remedies and contributes
to the efficacy of the regulatory structure, but also profoundly
affects the operation of the market itself.5 6 At the beginning of the
sense, as when a deep-sea species protected by the law is
threatened with extinction.
David P. Currie, Judicial Review Under Federal Pollution Laws, 62 IowA L. REv.
1221, 1278 (1977); see also RODGERS, supra note 26, at 26 (providing similar
argument regarding NEPA). Most environmental statutes that provide for
civil claims grant the right to bring a civil action to "any person." See, e.g.,
statutes cited supra note 50. Courts have not read this language to imply universal standing. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); United States
v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP 1), 412 U.S.
669 (1973); supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text (discussing Sierra Club
v. Morton and SCRAP ). More generally, it could be argued that the environmental statutes create new rights, that is, any person in the United States has a
right to the substance of the legislative promises made in the environmental
statutes. See FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 5, at 65-66. To date, this argument
has not found judicial favor, and probably will not under current due process
doctrine.
54 See GUIDO CAL.ABREsI, THE CosTs OF AccIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1970); Michelman, supra note 49, at 647-68 (describing and
deploying the analytic structure developed by Guido Calabresi for analyzing
accidents). Michelman's Pollution as Tort is an early example of a law and
economics approach to legal and institutional design. By affecting the
liability, and hence the cost associated with an activity, the tort regime subtly
and powerfully influences the behavior of economic actors. Tort thus
contributes to the market's construction.
55 Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1988) (including
amendments to Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA)).
56 Because the RCRA/CERCLA regime coordinates all three periods of
environmental law-archaic, classical, and modern-it represents an example
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1980's, it was argued that CERCLA alone had. made tort the heart
of contemporary environmental practice.5 7 Real estate transactions, corporate mergers, banking, and bankruptcy are all affected
by environmental law operating through the RCRA/CERCLA tort
regime. Far from being outmoded, tort has emerged from its
encounter with economics as one of the most sophisticated techniques of contemporary environmental policy.5"
In addition to these new-found strengths, archaic environmental
law retains the combination of accessibility, analytic power, and
conceptual flexibility that has made the common law so durable.
This was illustrated in the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, when
plaintiffs brought many common law claims, even though state and
federal statutes provided a plethora of causes of action.5 9 Tort is a
shared language, learned by every first-year law student, and a
sophisticated doctrinal structure capable of resolving a wide array
of conflicts among various parties. In contrast, statutory specifics
are seldom examined prior to litigation, and both the sophistication of statutory drafting and the foresight employed by the drafters
is highly variable. Tort can also offer remedies when statutory

of modern environmental governance. See infra notes 156-60 and
accompanying text (discussing the moments of environmental law).
57

Macbeth argues:

Superfund is bringing major changes to the practice of
environmental law, in some ways returning to its roots in the
concepts of tort law. This is the third revolution in environmental
litigation since the passage of the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) in 1970. During the first years, litigation focused on
how the balance of competing interests recognized by NEPA was
to be struck on projects undertaken or permitted by the federal
government. The mid-seventies brought controversies over the
detailed regulatory statutes for controlling air and water pollution.
The eighties are opening with the introduction of tort concepts.
Macbeth, supra note 52, at 7. Note the offhand claim that environmental law
is rooted in tort.
58 See, e.g., Joan M. Ferretti, Looking for the Big Picture-Developing a
Jurisprudencefor a Biotechnological Age, 10 PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 711 (1993)
(discussing the interrelationship between the common law and regulatory
regimes in establishing the appropriate climate for market activity).
59

See PLATER

ET AL.,

supra note 9, at 164. Plater served as advisory counsel

to the State of Alaska. See id. at 165-66 (excerpting Alaska's complaint in Exxon
case); see also Bruce B. Weyhrauch, Oil Spill Litigation:PrivateParty Lawsuits and
Limitations, 27 LAND & WATER L. REv. 363 (1992).
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agreement does not exist, notably in conflicts between sovereigns. 6°
In sum, environmental law remains firmly rooted in tort.
C. The Commitments of EnvironmentalAdjudication
Within the common law system, law was long defined as private
law, based on individual rights.61 The common law emphasis on
individual economic autonomy protected by a regime of rights fit
the contractual view of society prevalent-at least as a legal theory-throughout the nineteenth century. 6 2 Burgeoning technolog60 In the absence of a statute, common law principles can organize
relations among states. See Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee 1), 406 U.S. 91, 99100 (1972) (holding that common law principles apply, absent specific federal
statute); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Texas v. Pankey,
441 F.2d 236, 240 (10th Cir. 1971). In Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 317-20
(1981), the Supreme Court held that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988), as amended by the Clean Water Act, had
superseded federal common law. Although concepts of wrong at
international law are at least as closely allied with continental notions of delict
as with common law notions of tort, basic delictual concepts can also organize
the relations among nation states. See The Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3
R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1941) (containing dicta that one state could not inflict
harm on another); see also Affaire du Lac Lanoux (Spain v. Fr.), 12 R.I.A.A.
281 (1957); The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (1949)
(maintaining same proposition outside environmental context); Brunson
MacChesney, Judicial Decisions, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 156 (1959) (digesting
international cases).
61 Already in the eighteenth century, Blackstone wrote:
[I]t would be dangerous to allow any private man, or even any
public tribunal, to be the judge of this common good, and to
decide whether it be expedient or no. Besides, the public good is
in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of
every individual's private rights, as modeled by the municipal law.
1 Wi-LIM BLAcKsToNE, COMMENTARIES *135. No doubt American law
received much of its emphasis on private law from Blackstone, who was overwhelmingly concerned with common law actions in property, contract, tort,
and so forth, subjects a continental jurist would label private law. Blackstone
greatly influenced the formative periods of American law. "[N]o other legal
figure equaled his impact on the colonies." KEgMrT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAw IN AMERICAN HISTORY 52 (1989). This is not to deny that private law
has enormous public effects.
62 This view was summarized in Henry Sumner Maine's famous aphorism,
"the movement of progressive societies has hitherto been from Status to
Contract," and has been associated with substantive due process and the
Lochner era in U.S. law, when courts allowed natural rights to contract to
trump other laws. HENRYJ.S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 170 (10th ed. 1901). The
regnant historical understanding of American law divides American history
into three periods: a founding, devoted to the establishment of a basic
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ical development gave rise to new kinds of harm, including
environmental harm, but law nonetheless remained essentially private, and tort actions remained the primary remedy for harm.6 As
discussed in the preceding Section, even today environmental
harms are presented as infractions of individual liberties, particularly individual economic rights.
At the same time, "environmental" efforts to define the acceptable scope of economic activity respond to and delineate the
bounds of individual autonomy.'
Although individuals may not
intrude on other's rights, within the ambit of autonomy defined by
their own rights they may act pretty much as they please. The
recurrent issue for archaic environmental law is whether a particular activity should be characterized as "inside" an actor's sphere of
autonomy, or as an invasion of another's autonomy and hence
impermissible. The process of adjudication thus continually orients
archaic environmental law to the problem of defining the appropriate scope of individual autonomy.
In archaic environmental law, the environment figures only as
the medium through which harm is transmitted. Thus, archaic
environmental law is only environmental law by proxy, and is therefore unsatisfying to those who care about nature. Yet environmental law needs this archaic emphasis on the common law to be
effective in a market society. The common law rights of action are
basic to environmental law because they define the core rights of
private property and contract, and, through tort, the basic expectagovernmental framework; the nineteenth century era, devoted to economic
growth; and a modern era, devoted to the modern welfare state and the
universal procurement of individual liberties. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS

(1991); GRANT GILMORE,

AGES OF AMERICAN

(1977) (using this framework).
Considerable controversy exists about the tort regime's effect on the
process of industrialization in nineteenth century America. See MORTON J.
LAw
63

HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,

1780-1860 (1977).

Many

scholars have criticized Horwitz. For an annotated bibliography, see HALL,
supra note 61, at 368-69. My argument requires no position on the Horwitz
thesis beyond the very basic point-not contended to my knowledge-that
nineteenth century American lawyers (practitioners, judges, academics, even
usually legislators) thought of their work within the conceptual structures of
the common law, including tort.
64 A contract regime and a property regime also have much to say about
the matter. Contract and property, however, are more concerned with liberty
than harm. Therefore it seems most appropriate to think of environmental
problems in tort terms, and so "tort" and "the common law" are used virtually
indistinguishably here.
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tions of conduct essential to the market's function. Insofar as environmental law seeks to respond to market activity and to the desires
that cause people to be consumers, manufacturers, and polluters, it
cannot be (and has not been) insensitive to the internal logic of the
market itself. This logic is based on autonomous individuals.6 5
Despite its inherent qualities and new-found possibilities, the
common law has fundamental limitations as a legal expression of
environmental concerns.
[T] he common law alone, even when supplemented by imaginative
use of other bodies of law, is often not capable of handling larger
problems of environmental degradation. Common law remedies
may be too limited in character: they neither provide redress for
widespread public harms, nor do they provide a mechanism that
allows for insightful anticipatory intervention that would avert the
harmful consequences of environmentally unsound practices.
Stated differently, tort judgments for damages, and even injunctions, are generally private remedies for past wrongs. The remedies are limited to those whose interests are represented in court,
and many would-be plaintiffs are deterred from making that effort
by the difficulty and expense of legal action. In that way tort law
remedies fail to compensate and assist all victims of pollution and
environmental
other environmental harms, and the law governing
66
tort cases is reactive rather than protective.

65 Violations of the sphere of what is now seen as the autonomy defined by
the writs have, for a very long time, been actionable. However, a caveat is
necessary. Rights defined by the writs are considerably older than the
philosophical tradition that characterized them as private. This later tradition
informs this paper. Hobbes was born in 1588. The earliest English nuisance
case of which we have record was Rikhill's Case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 4, pl. 48
(1400), reprinted in BAR & MILSOM, supra note 33, at 581. This case was
brought as trespass, though nuisance was also discussed. I rely on the
authority of Baker and Milsom, who call RikhiU the first nuisance case. Several
new writs emerged in the fifteenth century. This serves to confuse the issue of
"the first nuisance" but supports my basic point, which is that one should not
draw easy conclusions from radically different legal systems. It would be
anachronistic to maintain that nuisance arose in a world in which government
and the individual were conceived of as opposed entities, in which the liberties
of the individual circumscribed a sphere of autonomy, and in which the
function and perfection of governance was the protection of that autonomy.
The culture that produced trespass and nuisance actions was different from
the milieu in which Blackstone wrote. Although one should not view the
historical rise of the ancient writs in terms of contemporary political emphasis
on individual autonomy, the common law can support political and economic
autonomy, as Blackstone also demonstrates.
66 PLATER ET AL., supra note 9, at 241.
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Archaic environmental law is radically incomplete. Law therefore has had to develop mechanisms that can (i) respond to environmental harms when their costs were below the cost of judicial
prosecution, and (ii) act to prevent damage. A partial answer can
be found in bureaucratic regulation.
III.

CLASsICAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: ADMINISTRATION AND THE
AGGREGATION OF TORT

A.

The Aggregation of Tort

The classical federal environmental statutes empower an agency,
usually the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to set standards, conduct tests, adjudicate conflicts, require certain technologies, order or oversee the clean-up of polluted sites, or otherwise
constrain governmental and private actors. The majority of regulations, including the constraints imposed by EPA, are justified by a
theory of market failure. In the view of neo-classical economics,
market failure is the only justification for such constraints.6 7
Market failure occurs in a variety of forms. Market failures that
justify the pollution statutes, and thus most U.S. environmental law,
are called spillover costs, or negative externalities.6" When this
67

"Some might argue that there are numerous other justifications for

regulatory programs. Through lengthy argument, it should be possible to
persuade those who advance other justifications that 'market defects' of the
sort listed in Chapter One lie at the bottom of their claims." STEPHEN BREYER,
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 7-8 (1982). I do not here defend the claim that
market defects are the only justifiable reason for regulation. Instead, I
attempt to demonstrate that the logic of market failure underpins American
thinking about administration. Toward the end of this Article, I argue that
environmental policies that cannot be justified in terms of the market pose
problems within liberal discourse. See infra notes 156-168 and accompanying

text.
68 Environmental law almost invariably concerns negative rather than
positive externalities. As used in this Article, "externality" implies negative
externality. The European Community (EC) passes much regulation in order
to harmonize the conditions for the single market. The single market is used
to justify regulation without relying directly on a distortion within a market.
Even so, a market rationale exists for EC regulation, because it is presumed
that the single market will be more efficient than national markets. But EC
regulatory activity often seeks distant benefits for a future Europe, rather than
correction for localized market failure. Contra BREYER, supra note 67. See
generally Single European Act, arts. 100a, 130r-t, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, 8, 11-12.
More importantly, the European approach organizes market thinking in
political terms, emphasizing the desirability of sustainable markets over

unsustainable ones.

See COMMISSION OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES, 26TH
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market failure is present, an activity's social effects are not adequately reflected in the price. Market actors respond to the price,
not the true cost of an item, so the social effects not reflected in the
price are "external" to market transactions.6 9
For example, dumping noxious manufacturing by-products into
the air creates negative externalities. The pollution imposes costs
upon society: health risks, reduced quality of life, lower property
values, and so forth. In an unregulated market, the manufacturer
pays neither to prevent nor to remedy the situation.7 ° The costs
associated with the pollution are borne by parties, such as the people downwind, who do not participate in the economic transactions
surrounding the manufacture of the item. The people downwind
are outside the process of economic decision. The harms they suffer are externalities.
A failed market inaccurately assesses the decisions of consumers,
and thereby gives producers and the economy bad information. As
a result of cost-shifting to downwind parties, the manufacturer in
GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcTrrris OF THE COMMUNITIES

197-210 (1992); Ffth

EnvironmentalProgramme,25 BuLL. E.C. 3-1992, at 1.2.115; see also id. at 1.3.145,
1.3.151, 1.3.179 (providing opinions on resolution).
69 Judge Stephen Breyer provides a typical example:
Suppose a factory can produce sugar either through production
method A or production method B. Method A costs 9 cents per
unit of production but sends black smoke billowing throughout
the neighborhood to the annoyance of neighbors for miles
around. Method B costs 10 cents per unit of production and
produces no smoke at all. The profit maximizing factory owner
adopts A although, if those injured by the smoke would willingly
pay more than 1 cent (per pound of sugar) to be rid of it, method
A is socially more expensive. Then B, not A, should be chosen,
because its total social costs-including costs of harm inflictedare lower. . . . Where the public prefers reduced pollution yet
finds no practical way to bribe the producer, too many of society's
resources are attracted (by lower prices not reflecting the cost of
pollution) into polluting processes and products, and too few are
attracted into pollution-free products and processes. Government
intervention arguably is required to help eliminate this waste.
BREYER, supra note 67, at 23.
70 That is, assuming the usual case, that transaction costs and free rider
problems are too great for the parties to contract. Even when the parties may
be able to contract, resulting in an allocatively efficient solution, a
distributional problem may result: The downstream users would have to pay
the manufacturer to stop poisoning the water. Governmental intervention
might be necessary to insure convergence on a Pareto optimal outcome, i.e.
an outcome in which allocative gains do not require localized losses.
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this market can offer the item at a price that is too low. The market
price is lower than the price that all of society pays, including manufacturers, consumers, and the people downwind. Consequently,
demand and production are higher than in a well-functioning market. This market has failed to transmit accurate information concerning the cost of production to consumers, and inaccurately
signals consumer demand to producers. Society uses the market to
decide how much of something to produce, what price it will cost,
who gets the product and what other goods will be avoided. Just as
not counting votes in an election vitiates the legitimacy of that election, the market's failure to assess consumer
demand accurately
7
results in an illegitimate economic outcome. '
The godfather of American law and economics, Judge Richard
Posner, points out that "[a] n important function of law is to internalize costs and benefits. Laws against pollution illustrate this function on the cost side. ... "7' Environmental law can create a more
71 Economic outcomes may also be illegitimate because they work social
inequities. See UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE,
Toxic WASTES AND RACE IN UNITED STATES (1987); UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING
CORRELATION

OFFICE,
WITH

SITING OF HAZARDOUS
RACIAL

AND

WASTE

ECONOMIC

LANDFILLS AND THEIR

STATUS

OF

SURROUNDING

COMMUNITIES 3 (1983). The interaction between social and environmental
concerns, and the sometimes conflicted politics among various "progressive"
concerns, have increasingly drawn the attention of legal academics. See
generally ROBERT BULLARDj DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY (1990); Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor & Poisoned:
Minority Grassroots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'y 69 (1991); Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It?
EnvironmentalJustice and the Siting of Locally UndesirableUses, 78 CORNELL L. REv.
1001 (1993); Luke W. Cole, Remedies for Environmental Racism: A View from the

Fied, 90 MICH.

L. REv.

1991

(1992); Richard J. Lazarus,

Pursuing

"EnvironmentalJustice". The DistributionalEffects of Environmental Protection, 87
Nw. U. L. REv. 787 (1993); Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theoy of
Environmental Race Discrimination,41 KAN. L. REV. 271 (1992). Recently, the
political system has begun to respond to the problem. See Federal Actions to
Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income
Populations, Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994). In a different
arena, see Global Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes: Final Act and Text of Basel Convention, Mar. 22, 1989, 28
I.L.M. 649 (entered into force May 5, 1992). But see THE INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN WASTES: A GREENPEACE INVENTORY 15 (1990) ("By providing a legal
framework within which to trade waste, the Convention legitimizes a practice
that should be considered a criminal activity.").
72 RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 320
(1988). Posner continues: "[T]he charitable exemption from income taxation
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accurate market by making the market price of an item approximate its true social cost. The manufacturer who must install a filter
to comply with environmental regulation passes the cost of the filter along to consumers. Consumers, in buying the now more
expensive product, show the extent to which they value this product
over other goods. By making prices reflect consumer preference
more accurately, environmental law legitimates market processes as
a mode of social decision.
Does the market-based society really require environmental law?
In an influential article, Professor Ronald Coase argues that when
transaction costs are zero, it does not matter which party has the
entitlement, because the parties will contract around the entitlement.7 3 The "Coase Theorem" states that, if bargaining is costless,
no government regulation will be necessary to achieve an allocatively efficient outcome. This allocation will reflect the greatest
total social benefit, regardless of distributional effects. The entitlement to pollute is generally presumed to belong to the manufacturer. The local residents have to pay the factory to stop the
pollution. In Judge Stephen Breyer's terms, "they [the public]
would bribe the producer."7 4 Alternatively, one could entitle the
local residents to be free from pollution. In order to pollute, the
factory must then buy the right from the local residents. Either
way, the costs of externalities would be balanced against the income
from production. In the absence of transaction costs, Coase argues
that when information is perfect, bargaining will strike the right
balance between industrial production and pollution production.
The position of the legal entitlement does not matter: the market
will find an efficient outcome. If this argument is true, it would
seem that environmental law is not needed.7 5
illustrates it on the benefit side (by making it cheaper to give to charity, the
exemption lowers the cost of producing an external benefit)." Id.
73 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-15 (1960).
74 BREYER, supra note 67, at 24.
75 Coase, supra note 73, at 29-30. Coase's article has been singularly
influential among lawyers. It may be the only economics article many have
read, and is oft-alluded to even by those who have not read it. Certainly a
discussion of Coase is in every environmental law textbook surveyed here. But
why? Coase's argument never applies in the real world. Transaction costs are
always positive; information is never perfect. At more theoretical levels,
problems abound, most of which Coase knew well. First, free-rider problems
may make bargaining impossible even where transaction costs are zero and
information is perfect. Second, the offer-acceptance problem may well mean
that the price paid by the factory for the purchase of the right to pollute will
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In the real world, however, bargaining is not costless and information is not perfect. When transaction costs become too high,
downwind parties will not join to solve the pollution problem
through contract. The transaction cost problem is exacerbated by
the diffuse nature of many harms. For instance, a polluting manufacturer may impose a minor inconvenience on a million people.
No individual will have an incentive to contract with the polluter
even though the aggregate harm is considerable. Neither will individual victims litigate. The cost of litigation, like the cost of contract, exceeds the cost of the harm suffered by each individual.
Where transaction costs are sufficiently high, rational victims suffer.
Externalities may therefore justify regulation, whereby government interferes with the performance of markets. Rephrased, the
market's failure to process information sometimes requires the
imposition of another information processing mechanism-regulatory bureaucracy. 76 By promulgating a pollution regulation, government aggregates the harms the manufacturer inflicts on its
neighbors. Because the regulated market internalizes costs that
would be externalities in an unregulated market, the regulated
be too high. Third, distributional problems, which the Coase theorem
attempts to avoid, affect activity levels. For example, if the locals bribe the
factory to use a filter, making production tolerable, the factory will still be able
to offer the sugar at the lower price associated with the dirtier method of
production. Consumers at the margin, who would not buy the more
expensive sugar will buy the less expensive sugar. Consequently, output of
sugar will be too high. Fourth, ordinary distributional problems abound. See
supra note 71 (discussing environmental justice). My only explanation for the
ubiquity of Coase's argument-even though I have never encountered a
situation in which allocation of the entitlement was unimportant-is that
Coase has become a warning to one's interlocutor that one is about to enter a
certain mode of discourse. Our society has become increasingly configured by
the output of markets, and our politics has become increasingly discussed in
the language of economics. Although economics is not new, the relative
absence of comparable modes of public discourse is. Technology has given us
a new politics, and that politics is discussed, sensibly enough, in the language
of economics. Coase, for all his undoubted merit, is constantly referred to
because lawyers feel a need to legitimate their use of the new discourse.
(Funny that the part of a lawyer's soul that begs for authority would be
satisfied by something as thin as a footnote to an article published in a thenobscure academic journal over a generation ago.) Coase is thus a way of
referring to the new world, the Amerigo Vespusci of contemporary political
language, constantly mentioned heedless of his achievement.
76 This holds only in those instances in which bureaucratic failure is less
than market failure. See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text (discussing
the failure of bureaucracy).
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market more closely approximates a perfect market. Ideally, the
regulated market produces an outcome that would result if bargaining and information were costless.
Because regulation compensates for market failure, classical environmental law succeeds archaic environmental law. The market
failure concept shows the need for internalizing externalities, and
also demonstrates tort's inability to vindicate fully environmental
harms. Regulation is thus required when the common law system
cannot internalize the environmental harms associated with market
activity.
B.

The Tragedy of the Commons7 7

Government action may also be used to prevent destructive collective action phenomena, which in the environmental context are
often collectively called "the tragedy of the commons." Introducing
the phrase, Garret Hardin delivered a canonical statement of the
collective action problem:
The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to
keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. . . . As a rational
being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or
implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to
me of adding one more animal to my herd?" This utility has one
negative and one positive component.
1) The positive component is a function of the increment of
one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from
the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1.
2) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of
overgrazing are shared by all the herdsman, the negative utility for
any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of -1.
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational
herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and
another. . . . [B]ut this is the conclusion reached by each and
every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to
increase his herd without limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is
the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own
best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the com78
mons. Freedom in a common brings ruin to all.
77
78

Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
Id. at 1244.
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The tragedy of the commons is not limited to goods extracted from
the commons, such as grazing land, fish stocks, or individual use of
national parks. It also exists in problems of pollution:
Here it is not a question of taking something out of the commons,
but of putting something in-sewage, or chemical, radioactive,
and heat wastes into water; noxious and dangerous fumes into the
air; and distracting and unpleasant adyertising signs into the line
of sight. The calculations of utility are much the same as before.
The rational man finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he
discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his
wastes before releasing them. Since this is true for everyone, we
are locked into a system of "fouling our own nests," so long
as we
79
behave only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers.

The solution preferred by Hardin is one that this Article takes up
in the next Section: eliminating the commons through privatization. If the herdsman in the example owned his own land, it would
not be rational to overgraze it. In other situations, however, privatization may not be feasible. To use two of Hardin's examples, it is
difficult to imagine a government privatizing either the high seas or
the visual environment. In such circumstances, limiting use of the
common through regulation is a better solution. The collective
action phenomena that justify privatization will also justify traditional regulation, although one or the other approach may produce a better outcome in a particular case.
By articulating the problem posed by collective action phenomena, Hardin translates the problem of externalities into the language of the commons. The vocabulary of externalities and the
vocabulary of the commons describe the same phenomena, but
each lexicon implies a certain perspective. The vocabulary of externalities presents decisions such as whether or not to manufacture a
product in a microeconomic context. The producer evaluates the
costs of production against expected returns on sales. Certain
harms associated with pollution, for example the loss of health due
to the manufacturing process, may be borne by society but not communicated to the producer.8 0 Such externalities are dumped into
an undefined space outside of the transaction under discussion.
In contrast, the language of the commons is global. The imagery
of the commons gives substance to the idea of the environment as
what is held in common. In our example, the atmosphere is a com79 Id. at 1245.

The victims may suffer reduced health, and they, or some societal organ
(but not the producer), pays the cost of health care.
80
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mon. Although the language of externalities defines the world in
terms of the producer and consumer, the imagery of the commons
places the producer within the context of a larger world. In the
language of externalities, the polluting producer is unaware of and
unconnected to the havoc wreaked outside its cost structure. From
the perspective of the commons, the producer is defrauding the
public by taking its clean air without paying. The choice of imagery
within each model reveals a bias. Small wonder that the language
of the commons is often used among environmentalists and the language of externalities among economists of a libertarian bent."1
81 Perhaps environmentalists should be wary. I find the popularity and
influence of The Tragedy of the Commons bizarre. Hardin's article seems to have
hardly been read. This Article's text reproduces the standard
environmentalist misinterpretation of Hardin, which uses the imagery of
theater and commonality to stress individual and collective obligation to a
context. While this interpretation is poetic, it is not at all supported by
Hardin's article. For Hardin, the common environment is not the context of
our general obligation, but an evil to be remedied by massive privatization.
What are we to make of Hardin's substantive argument? Hardin draws
arguments, without much care, from Nietzsche, bank robbers (reminiscent of
Augustine), Hegel, and others. Once one learns what an externality is, it is
difficult to know what to do with thisjumble. Hardin quotes Neitzsche, "a bad
conscience is a kind of disease," and buttresses that with Bateson's studies of
schizophrenia, to argue that conscience should be abolished. His mode of
doing so is coercive privatization. In the perfectly privatized world, selfinterest, sans conscience (or, one assumes, any other sympathetic feeling) will
lead to optimal allocation. Hardin is quite aware of the coercive quality of his
prescription. "Every new enclosure of the commons involves the infringement
of somebody's personal liberty ....

It is the newly proposed infringements

that we vigorously oppose; cries of 'rights' and 'freedom' fill the air. When
men mutually agreed to pass laws against robbing, mankind became more
free, not less so." Hardin, supra note 77, at 1248.
Four points deserve mentioning. First, whatever the situation viewed from
Hardin's atemporal eminence, I find some of his "newly proposed
infringements on liberty" troubling. For example, as much as I share Hardin's
aversion to advertising, I am unwilling to sweep away First Amendment
freedoms, including the right to play music in one's store. (I find it
particularly difficult to blame our advertising-which is nothing if not
lascivious-on the Puritans.) Second, in small compass, Hardin explicitly
makes Hobbes's argument for the omnipotence of the state, an argument that
underpins all liberal notions of administration. Third, Hardin's imperialism is
rarely remarked upon. The requirement of security, however, leads to an
unbounded liberalism, in which potential enemies are drawn into the
consensual web of the liberal order. While this may indeed be the world's
fate, it certainly has imperial aspects, best stated by Immanuel Kant in To
Perpetual Peace: A PhilosophicalSketch, reprinted in PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER
ESSAYS 107 (Ted Humphrey trans., 1983) (1795). Fourth, despite my use of
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C.

The End of Nature2

The global commons idea has gained a great deal of currency.
The notion that the entire globe should be common and within the
domain of politics has been uncritically adopted by the international environmental community.83 Hardin's argument implicitly
claims that all which is not private, or at least controlled by the
8 4
government, is common. and organized within human dominion.
Similarly, for the economist using the language of externalities, the
idea of the commons is also implicit.8 5 Although radical, the claim
that politics is literally omnipresent is not new. Immanuel Kant
explicitly denied the possibility of a realm outside politics by denying the possibility of a rational law that could separate the world of
legislation from a natural world.
It is possible for me to have any external object of my choice as
mine, that is, a maxim by which, if it were to become a law, an
object of choice would in itself (objectively)
have to belong to no one
s
(res nullius) is contrary to rights.
Sophocles in Section III D, I doubt that Hobbesian man is capable of tragic
greatness, or whether the liberal order is likely to instill or can sustain
megalopsychia.
82 The title of this section is from Bill McKibben's excellent book, THE END
OF NATURE (1989).
83 "The traditional forms of national sovereignty are
increasingly
challenged by the realities of ecological and economic interdependence.
Nowhere is this more true than in shared ecosystems and in 'the global
commons'-those parts of the planet that fall outside national jurisdictions."
WORLD COMMISSION ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON

FUTURE (The Brundtland Report) 261 (1987)

[hereafter

OUR COMMON

FUTURE].
84

But see generally EDWARD ABBEY,
(1968); ALDO LEOPOLD, A

WILDERNESS

DESERT SOLITAIRE; A SEASON

IN THE

SAND COUNTY ALMANAC at viii

(1949)

(arguing that land should not be viewed as a commodity belonging to

humans).
85 Those not inside the microeconomic
transaction, including the
economist, are equally outside the microcosm; the common is indeterminate,
and hence open to discussion by all. (The commons is the ground of future
analysis.)
86 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 68 (Mary Gregor trans.,
1991) (1797). Kant continues:
For an object of my choice is something that I have the physical
power to use. If it were nevertheless absolutely not within my
,rightfulpower to make use of it, that is, if the use of it could not

coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a
universal law (would be wrong), then freedom would be depriving
itself of the use of its choice with regard to an object of choice, by
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Interested in the bounds of moral reason, Kant posited the potential dominion that a rational agent might have over a thing. In a
technological society, however, everything is an object of human
agency. Modern technology has realized Kant's argument. What
lies outside global climate change? The answer is nothing, because

technology allows human activity to affect the entire globe. With
that answer, the distinction between nature and culture is gone.

This is the point of Bill McKibben's book, The End of Nature.
The idea of nature will not survive the new global pollution-the
carbon dioxide and the CFCs and the like. This new rupture with
nature is different not only in scope but also in kind from salmon
tins in an English stream. We have changed the atmosphere, and
thus we are changing the weather. By changing the weather, we
make every spot on earth man-made and artificial. We have
deprived nature of its independence, and that is fatal to its meaning. Nature's independence is its meaning; without it there is
nothing but us ...
But we have ended the thing that has, at least in modem times, defined
naturefor us - its separationfrom human society.87

For Kant in theory, and for McKibben in practice, liberal environmental jurisprudence verges on being an oxymoron. The thorough-going liberal acknowledges no law regarding nature, and
acknowledges no political authority not contained within liberalism

itself 8

The planet has become an object of human concern and

putting usable objects beyond any possibility of being used; in other
words, it would annihilate them in a practical respect and make
them into res nullius, even though in the use of things choice was
formally consistent with everyone's outer freedom in accordance
with universal laws. But since pure practical reason lays down only
formal laws as the basis for using choice and thus abstracts from its
matter, that is, from other properties of the object provided only that
it is an object of choice, it can contain no absolute prohibition against
using such an object, since this would be a contradiction of outer
freedom with itself. But an object of my choice is that which I have
the physical capacity to use as I please, that whose use lies within
my power (potentia) . . . It is therefore an a priori presumption of
practical reason to regard and treat any object of my choice as
something that could objectively be mine or yours.
Id. at 68-69.
87 McIBBEN, supra note 82, at 58, 64.
88 This argument is restricted to Kant's rational being of the moral works.
A Kantian response to the passage would be that much of law is a human
enterprise, not a purely moral one. Humans may be contrasted with purely
moral beings in part by their finitude-their consciousness of limitations
other than purely rational ones. This response refutes my remark that Kant
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responsibility, not the ground of our actions, but the world of our
possibility. "This new reality, from which there is no escape, must
be recognized-and managed."8 9 If there is no separate nature,
environmental law can only address the use of things.
D.

Oedipal Struggles

Perhaps due to a historical imagination that conjures an age of
minimal participation in economic activity by formal politics, regulation requires a level of political justification not required of markets.9° Widespread regulation of economic activity is a relatively
recent phenomenon, associated in the United States with the New
Deal. Regulation continues to be seen as artificial governmental
interference with the prior order of things. For example, Judge
Breyer maintains that "the relation between the regulator and the
regulated is adversarial. In part, this is because the regulator must
lead the industry to perform in a way different from that dictated by
the incentives of the unregulated market."9 '
For this reason, conscientious regulation can only follow market
92
failure. Yet market failure is insufficient to justify regulation.
Government intervention is only justified when a bureaucratic decidenies the possibility of a realm outside politics-he denies the possibility of a
realm outside morality. While perhaps fruitful for a future politics that draws
on the Kant of the CritiqueofJudgment, my initial remark is nonetheless true for
contemporary politics, which draws on the Kant of the moral works. Cf
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT (J.H. Bernard trans. 1951) (1790).
89 OUR COMMON FutruR, supranote 83, at 1; see also Special Issue, Managing
Planet Earth, Sci. AM., Sept. 1989, at 1.
90 I take no stand on the question of whether the United States ever
experienced an economy that might be called laissez faire; my claim is only
that the idea of the unregulated or natural market remains a vital part of our
self-understanding. See, e.g., AcKERMAN, supra note 62, at 113-30.
91 BREYER, supra note 67, at 6.
92 Throughout this Article, markets are privileged over administration.
Markets are presumptively the mode of public choice, and other modes are
used essentially to supplement market processes. The substantive reasons for
this presumption may be summarized, first, as a result of historical prejudice.
Second, liberal ideology inherently prefers markets. Individual choice is
exercised more frequently and more directly through markets than through
legislatures, so markets are more authentic. Third, markets are preferable
due to their superior efficiency and information allocation, as discussed
below. Even so, these substantive reasons for the prejudice that marks this
argument are dwarfed by my sense that contemporary politics is conducted in
the language of economics. See infta note 172 and accompanying text
(discussing relationship between markets and politics).
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sional process can provide a "better" outcome, such as by choosing
a technology for pollution abatement. 93 Better is usually defined as
what an efficient market would have done. The works of neo-classical liberal regulatory theorists such as Judge Breyer categorize
administrative ways to simulate market behavior and ways to balance bureaucratic weaknesses with the imperfections of existing
markets. 94 Similarly, the perspective of the commons justifies privatization (indirect government allocation through the establishment
of a market) because of the structural weaknesses built into the
market. Both rationales assume that the market cannot provide the
optimal outcome.9 5
But just as no simple market exists, in the real world there is no
simple government, and the turn from liability regimes to administration is a complex process, the maturation of the body politic.
The classic cases under the major environmental statutes9 6 are
struggles over how to realize an idea of society mandated-in the
93 There are some theorists who baldly hold this theory. See, e.g., BREYER
supra note 67. I think market failure serves better as a conceptual tool with
which to think about regulation, than as an absolute prerequisite.
94 Legislatures are not theorists, and may act from a variety of motives.
Nonetheless, legislative action has seemed broadly in line with the thoroughgoing commitment to market structures protected by the common law. "In
the environmental field, despite the potential reach of legislative supremacy,
legislatures have usually not been eager to displace the working of the
common law. Most legislation has sought to supplement or clarify pre-existing
common law norms." PLATER ET AL., supra note 9, at 243.
95 See KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed.

1963). "If we exclude the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility,
then the only methods of passing from individuals tastes to social preferences
which will be satisfactory and which will be defined for a wide range of sets of
individual orderings are either imposed or dictatorial." Id. at 59; see also
Bernard Grofman, Public Choice, Civic Republicanism, and American Politics:
Perspectives of a "ReasonableChoice" Modeler, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1541 (1993). The
market cannot provide a rational outcome for another reason, as discussed by
economist Kenneth Arrow. Arrow's Theorem holds that in any group of three
or more actors, the behavior of the actors must in some way be constrained in
order for any decision-making process to produce a necessarily rational
outcome. ARRow, supra, at 46-60. Facially neutral economic arguments thus
presuppose some level of choice, and therefore political bias. I do not discuss
Arrow's Theorem in the text because the theorem seems useless for arguing
for any specific policy. The debate between various modes of politics, here
bureaucracy and the market, is not over which will provide a truly rational
outcome, but over which will produce a more rational outcome. For all its
elegance, in policy debate Arrow's Theorem is just a formal reminder that the
entire enterprise of ordering human affairs is dubious.
96 See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 50.
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abstract and so incomplete-by Congressional legislation. Environmental law cases are as much about governance and the uses of law
as they are about the environment. From this perspective, the classic environmental law cases fall into two types. Each type addresses
a basic political relationship transformed by an environmental
statute.
The first type of environmental litigation challenges the use of
regulation rather than market mechanisms (reined in by the safeguards of archaic environmental law) 7 to reach a particular societal outcome. The statutes at issue in these cases alter the
relationship between the political mechanisms of regulation and
the market, and thereby raise litigable questions about the details
of the new relationship.9" In refining the legislative notion of
appropriate administrative action under the statute, and, conversly,
the area of autonomy marked off by the regulation, courts give
nuance and detail to the relationship between the government and
the governed, and thereby articulate the manner in which government exercises power over society.99
The second group of classical environmental law cases challenges
environmental administration, 100 not vis-a-vis the claims of society,
but in terms of governance itself. In particular, National Environ97 At the same time, archaic environmental law has expanded into new
areas, such as toxic tort. In many instances archaic law provided more than
minimal safeguards to individual rights, and by extension, to the environment.
See supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text (discussing archaic
environmental law).
98 See, e.g., Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983); Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 683 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1982); Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), modified sub nom. Reserve
Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181 (1976).
99 There are many procedural ways to do this. Plaintiffs may challenge
government action or inaction by challenging the statute itself, perhaps
through a takings claim. See infranote 183 and accompanying text (discussing
takings cases). Plaintiffs may also challenge the defendant's failure to act
under the statute, or argue that the defendant's action is not authorized by
the statute, or that the defendant has misread the statute, so that the
defendant's action does not reflect the true meaning of the law. Each of these
tactics has a political result, and further defines the relationship between
government and governed.
100 See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (challenging
other governmental agencies' administration insofar as they affect
environment).
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mental Policy Act (NEPA) Section 102 mandates that environmental values be considered in the decisions of virtually every organ of
"Congress did
the federal government alongside its other goals.'
not establish environmental protection as an exclusive goal; rather,
it desired a reordering of priorities, so that environmental costs and
benefits will assume their proper place along with other considerations." 0 2 NEPA explicitly raises a conflict inherent in environmental politics between environmental values and other values. This
second set of classical environmental cases challenges whether the
environmental end in question is appropriately pursued to the disadvantage or advantage of some competing policy. These cases
whether the government has correctly ordered its
basically ask
03
priorities.1
The distinction between classical environmental law cases is primarily analytical. The inquiries undertaken by the two types of
cases overlap. A government that does not set its priorities correctly
treads on its citizenry."' Similarly, a government that treads on its
citizenry has an indefensible set of priorities. This is a basic lesson
from American constitutional history-the proper relationship
between government and civil society requires the proper relationship among the parts of government. Classical environmental law
101 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (1988).
102 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Judge Skelly Wright's
opinion set the tone for subsequent interpretation of NEPA.
103 See, e.g., Weinberger, 465 U.S. at 305; Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153 (1978); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390
(1976); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971),
overruled by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); Public Citizen v. United
States Trade Rep., 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
104 In the context of environmental crime, the implicit tension between
regulation and private action, between the will of the state and that of the
individual, makes for a dramatic conflict. Both case law and statutory law
increasingly provide for criminal liability for environmental violations. See
generally Helen J. Brunner, Environmental Criminal Enforcement: A Retrospective
View, 22 ENVTL. L. 1315 (1992); Thomas M. Downs, Recent Developments in
Environmental Crime, 17 WM. & MARYJ. ENvrL. L. 1 (1992); Eighth Survey of
White Collar Crime: Environmental Crimes, 30 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 565 (1993);
Symposium, Environmental Criminal Law, 34 ARIz. L. REv. 571 (1992);
Symposium, Crimes Against the Environment: Current Policies and Future Trends in
Environmental Criminal Enforcement, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 201-391 (1991).
Because of its kinship to tort, environmental crimes might also be
understood-and taught-in relation to archaic environmental law.
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thus recapitulates
the fundamental concerns of the American legal
10 5
heritage.
The prevalence and technicality of environmental litigation reemphasizes the complexity of the turn from market-based archaic
environmental law to regulatory classical environmental law.
Administrative law makes explicit the idea of limited government
implicit in archaic environmental law. Administrative agencies take
over only when markets have failed and government action could
do better. The courts serve to ensure that administration does not
aggregate too much power. Classical environmental law is thus a
complement to the market that is, somewhat paradoxically,
obsessed with the market.
Even where markets fail, the structure of classical environmental
law incessantly recalls its market origins. Administrative law begins
by recognizing the failure of the market to harness properly the
disparate wills of actors. By passing regulations, bureaucrats
attempt to replace consumer choice aggregated through the flawed
unregulated market with reasoned guesses about the aggregation of
consumer choice in a hypothetical well-functioning market. 106 In
doing so, bureaucrats, like Oedipus, try to take various and inchoate desires that converge disastrously, and place them within a
rational frame in which the exercise of will leads to satisfaction
rather than disaster. In contrast to Oedipus, at least the Oedipus at
Colonus, the bureaucrats who create classical environmental law do
not cease to glorify the individual will. The exercise of rational
choice remains the lodestar of regulation; regulation justifies itself
by claiming to satisfy the will of more individuals than a flawed
market.
But administrative law can only satisfy the will of some people by
thwarting the will of others. Regulation is deliberately coercive,
and the relation between regulator and regulated is adversarial.'0 7
To justify this coercion, theorists of administrative law refer to nega105 See CAss SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE gIGHrs REVOLUTION 13, 25-29 (1990)
(situating right to clean environment in fabric of constitutional law).

In what may be characterized as the antitrust approach, regulators may
struggle to imagine, and then provide, a well-functioning market. This
approach is both important and different from direct regulation, but has been
of less importance in the environmental context than classical regulation.
Moreover, this approach more fundamentally resembles constructed markets,
discussed below, than it does classical regulation. See supra note 68 and
accompanying text (discussing the establishment of a European market).
107 BREYER, supra note 67, at 6.
106
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tive externalities and destructive collective action phenomena.
Against such anarchy, the rule of bureaucrats is the only safeguard.1 08 In the practice of administrative law, the conscious
rationality of bureaucrats replaces the will of market actors, but that
practice is preceded and legitimated by the autonomous choices of
the marketplace. While administration straddles the divide
between consciousness and unconsciousness, it ultimately locates
all normative authority in the will of individuals. 10 9
To summarize the ideal history so far, archaic law conceptually
precedes classical law because the market or archaic law failed to
provide remedies, thus necessitating the aggregation of tort in regulation. Archaic law precedes classical environmental law in another
sense: archaic law depends for its authority on the prior order,
because it harks back to the order disturbed by the tortious activity.
Classical environmental law, in contrast, has no authoritative prior
order. Prior to regulation, the market was flawed, and therefore
has little authority. Instead, classical environmental law draws
authority from an ideal efficient market. By providing its own
authority, classical environmental law is atemporal, and is continually justified.

108 Ultimately justified by necessity in a tragic world, administrative law

recapitulates the birth of the liberal order. (Those who might think my use of
the word "tragic" not only wrong but also excessive may recall the title of
Garrett Hardin's article, supra note 77.) Administrative law is thus a response
not only to market failure, but also to the failure of human solidarity.
109 It might be argued that the appropriate, and perhaps the actual, model
for the agency is the well-functioning legislature, not the efficient market.
Implicit in this development [of modem administration review] is
the assumption that there is no ascertainable, transcendent
"public interest," but only the distinct interests of various
individuals and groups in society. . . . This analysis suggests that
if agencies were to function as a forum for all interests affected by
agency decisionmaking, bargaining leading to compromises
generally accepted to all might result, thus replicating the process
of legislation.
Agency decisions made after adequate
consideration of all affected interests would have, in microcosm,
legitimacy based on the same principle as legislation. . ..
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L.
REv. 1667, 1712 (1975). Stewart conceives of legislatures, however, as similar
to markets; that is, as institutions for the aggregation of private interests. Even
in Stewart's terms, bureaucracies are engaged in an Oedipal struggle.
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MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE DECENTRALIZATION

OF POLITICS

A.

The Atrophy of Administration

In recent years the belief that centralized government can accomplish the ends it sets for itself has dramatically diminished.' °
Broad social ends, associated with the Russian Revolution and its
aftermath, including the New Deal, now seem beyond the capability
of government and its bureaucratic methods. The argument for
why the old faith in governance was misplaced is familiar. Government regulation is wasteful, government functionaries lack the
incentives to do their jobs well or creatively, and so forth. In contrast, competitive markets ensure that people work hard, study their
business, and seek creative solutions to defend or enlarge their market share in the face of competitive innovation. In sum, government regulation is ineffective in comparison with market
mechanisms. 1 '
As belief in governmental efficacy has declined, so has faith in
the legitimacy of governmental processes. Traditionally, United
States laws have been legitimated by the democratic process
through which they were established. Laws have not drawn legitimacy from either showing efficiency in distributing goods, or, at
least not formally, from demonstrating that a certain legal arrangement is allocatively optimal. But lately the claim that a law, as the
outcome of a legislative process, is democratically legitimate has
been undermined, both within the academy and among the citizenry. Governments are seen as prey to a host of special interests
that are not representative of the people. The scale of contemporary national politics gives force to the argument that government is
too large to know and care about the welfare of its ant-like
constitutents.
110 This Section attempts to summarize several aspects of the intellectual
milieu that influence American environmental doctrine, and is necessarily
somewhat vague. It would be difficult to show that my characterization of this
diffuse milieu is basically correct, and certainly I have simplified. To specify
somewhat: by neo-classical economics I mean the collection of doctrines
espoused by the editorial board of The Economist.
111 But seeJonas Prager, Contracting-Out:Theoy and Policy, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 73 (1992) (arguing that significant contracting costs, such as
monitoring performance and opportunistic contractor behavior, may make
government provision of many services less costly than private sector provision
of same services).
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Many who had traditionally defended an activist government in
partisan politics are now dissatisfied with government action. Discontent with democratic political processes has encouraged the
widespread turn toward markets.1 12 Markets are arguably more
neutral than legislatures dominated by special interest groups.
Moreover, the enjoyment of private property has an intimate quality regardless of how broad the market might be. In a consumer
society, people-even political theorists-express and define themselves largely through market activity, particularly shopping. Consumption, not participation in representative politics, defines the
bourgeois inhabitants of large polities. 1 3 In brief, markets are currently seen as more efficacious, and if not exactly more legitimate,
then at least more authentic, than legislatures. Consequently, laws
should defer to the market whenever possible. In the environmental arena, the change in the zeitgeist has engendered modem environmental law, which is the attempt to realize environmental policy
through the construction of markets. As yet, little explicitly modem environmental law exists. Most modern environmental law is
still merely an argument for incentive-based systems of
regulation.'
Incentive systems may be considered analytically in one of two
forms. The first involves the legislation of entitlements and the sec112 See BRUCE

A. ACKERMAN

ET AL., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR
(1974) (providing an early example). Other
responses do not turn to markets. Among legal academics, much of
contemporary discontent with democratic politics is expressed in
communitarian and civic republican critiques of democratic politics. These
perspectives, while interesting, have yet to make themselves politically
relevant.
113 For a more elaborate version of this argument, see David A. Westbrook,
One Among Millions: An American Perspective on Citizenship in Large Polities, 2
ANNALES DE DROIT DE LOUVAIN 333 (1993).
114 See generally, FREDRICK R. ANDERSON
ET
AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES (1977); JOHN H. DALES,
POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES (1968) (providing an early statement of the
ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALITY

idea of pollution charges, offered in the context of water pollution); TIMOTHY
E. WIRTH & JOHN HEINZ, PROJECT 88: HARNESSING MARKET FORCES TO PROTECT
OUR ENVIRONMENT: INrrIATIVES FOR THE NEW PRESIDENT (1988); Bruce A.
Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STANFORD L.

REV. 1333 (1985); Adam Chase, The Efficiency Benefits of "Green Taxes". A Tribute
to SenatorJohn Heinz, 11 UCLAJ. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (1992);Jerold S. Kayden,
Market-BasedRegulatory Approaches: A ComparativeDiscussion ofEnvironmental and
Land Use Techniques in the United States, 19 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 565 (1992).
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ond involves the imposition of taxes." 5 The legislation of entitlements, like granting a subsidy, is a use of the positive power of
government to favor actors in the marketplace. In contrast, the
imposition of taxes disfavors actors in the marketplace. Neo-classical economics characterizes subsidy and tax as interventions in a
prior, and presumably healthy, market. The dichotomy between
entitlement and tax both reflects and differs from the neo-classical
economist's tendency to characterize virtually every market intervention as either a subsidy or a tax.' 1 6 This vision looks backward,
to a time of consumer choice unconstrained by the distortions of
intervention." 7 Modem environmental law, by contrast, looks forward to an accurate market, in which allocative efficiency is attained
because the true societal cost of an item is represented by its price.
To achieve this market, a far more complex legal regime is required
than the simple collection of common law property and contract
rights, and the other minimal accoutrements of civilization, beloved
by neo-classical economists.
In its attempt to construct an accurate market, modern environmental law has adopted many of the normative arguments of classical economics. These arguments counsel that government should
not interfere with healthy markets, should limit centralized governance to providing an infrastructure required for market activity,
and should act to heal a badly flawed market. Theoretically, modem environmental lawarises only when markets are unhealthy or
when new markets are required. But on inspection, environmentalists find most markets unhealthy, so opportunities to heal flawed
markets abound. Moreover, in a technological age, new markets
115

Many economic interventions, for example labeling requirements, may

not be well described as either subsidies or taxes. See generally infra notes 116,
140 and accompanying text (discussing subsidies and taxes).
116 The bifurcation between subsidy and tax may hide as much as it reveals.
Important differences among the members of each category abound.
Moreover, one might characterize the same intervention, such as a hazardous
waste regulation, as both a tax on one industry (manufacturers) and a subsidy
of others (lawyers or waste management consultants). Because it obscures
nuance, lends itself to specious polarization, and masks the problem of tense
addressed in the text, the subsidy and tax categories have probably had a
deleterious effect on politics.
117 I would go further and say that the aspiration of neo-classical economics
is for a market in which there are no external intrusions on consumer choice,
which would be a market prior to culture. While I know of no economic work
that is entirely forthcoming with this desire, I am reminded of Rawls'
argument from the original position. See JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971).
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are constantly being created. In contrast to neo-classical economics, which tends to favor restricting the scope of governance, modern environmental law uses economic arguments to
increase the
118
ambit of governance over environmental questions.
B.

The Move to Incentives

As discussed above, the tragedy of the commons justifies regulatory limitations on use of the commons. It also justifies abolishing
the public ownership of the commons through privatization and
free market environmentalism. 1 9 To return to Hardin's example:
If the common grazing land is converted into freehold property,
then it will no longer be in the herdman's interest to overgraze the
land. 12 0 In the long run, overgrazing would make him poor. Consequently, he will not buy more cows than his land can support.
Also, because exclusive use is one of the characteristics of ownership, the herdsman can exclude other herdsman's cows. Likewise,
other owners can exclude his cows. Because no herdsman can freeload by grazing cows on another's land, each herdsman will buy no
more cows than the land can support. He will buy the maximum
number of cows that his land can support. The result is allocatively
optimal: wealth, measured in cows, is maximized, and resources are
only minimally depleted.
Now suppose that one farmer is a genius of cattle farming, and
can produce healthy calves more cheaply than the other farmers.
He will start selling extra calves to his neighbors rather than turning them into veal for his own table. As his operation expands, he
will need more land, which he can afford to buy from less efficient
farmers. Over time, as productivity increases the land will be transferred into the hands of those who are better at raising cattle. The
creation of entitlements (through land ownership) thus provides
the incentives not only for husbandry of existing resources, but also
for material progress. Where the overgrazed common had experienced a disastrous fall in productivity, the privatized common
118 Given the geneology of the argument, the tendency of modem
environmental law to argue for more government-albeit government of a
new sort-is ironic enough.
119 This Article argues that there is a logical progression of legal responses
to environmental problems. For a similar argument, rooted in the language
of the commons, see Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls:
Management Strategiesfor Common Resources, 1991 DuKE L.J. 1.
120 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing Hardin's
example).
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experiences instead optimal productivity, improving as new techniques for cattle production are discovered. All these benefits rest
on creating an entitlement to a part of the once-common grazing
land.
Free market environmentalism advocates creating property rights
and then allowing market behavior in the property rights to achieve
environmental ends. Stewardship of the environment is motivated
by the property owner's self-interest. Good stewardship results
because the owner, unlike the government, is in close contact with
the environment, and therefore pays attention to the environment's needs. 2 '
This argument should not be overstated to imply that government is not necessary: ordinary markets require government, and
so does environmental policy achieved through creating
entitlements.
Free market environmentalism emphasizes an important role for
government in the enforcement of property rights. With clearly
specified titles-obtained from land recording systems, strict liability rules, and adjudication of disputed property rights in courtsmarket processes can encourage good resource stewardship. It is
when rights 122
are unclear and not well enforced that over-exploitation occurs.

This view of the role of government in the creation of entitlement
systems is still too narrow. Even when it does not exercise stewardship over the environment itself, governmental activity includes
more than enforcement. The government creates the property
right.'23 As the passage above notes, much of the value of rights
As Anderson and Leal argue:
At the heart of free market environmentalism is a system of wellspecified property rights to natural resources. Whether these
rights are held by individuals, corporations, non-profit
environmental groups, or communal groups, a discipline is
imposed on resource users because the wealth of the owner of the
property right is at stake if bad decisions are made. Of course, the
further a decision maker is removed from this discipline-as he is
when there is political control-the less likely it is that good
resource stewardship will result. Moreover, if well-specified
property rights are transferable, owners must not only consider
their own values, they must also consider what others are willing to
pay.
TERRY ANDERSON & DONALD LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 3 (1991).
121

122
123

Id.

To extend a common metaphor: Government cuts the wood of liberty
into lengths and bundles the sticks together. We call the finished product
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stems from their transferability. 1 4 Free market environmentalism
thus recreates the private law system of property, contract, and tort
that archaic environmental law relied on and that classical environmental law attempted to simulate. 1 25 Modem politics sees the primary role of government as creating and maintaining markets, not
providing extra-market remedies or correcting market failure.
Modem environmental law creates markets that will realize environmental policies in a decentralized and presumptively efficient
fashion.
The Clean Air Act (CAA) 126 illustrates the role of government in
creating entitlements. It also provides the most developed use 'of
an entitlement regime for environmental ends in American law.
Prior to 1990, the regulatory regime established under the CAA
defined three methods of trading pollution: bubbles, netting, and
offsets.'1 7 All three allow an enterprise to operate an otherwise
impermissible source of pollution if the enterprise "trades" the pollution for a pollution reduction elsewhere. These trades allow the

enterprise to comply with CAA required emission reductions. Bubbles and netting involve trade-offs among sources of pollution
within a single firm. In contrast, offsets are traded frequently
28
among firms, and are therefore of the most theoretical interest.'
Offset entitlements 129 allow (otherwise prohibited) new large stationary sources of air pollution within areas that have not attained
the air quality levels required by the CAA. If the owner of a new
source of pollution can show that the total level of air pollution will
drop, regulators will permit the new source of pollution. In theory,
private property, but it is the creation of governmental efforts. Alternately,
the availability of enforcement mechanisms can be understood, in American
Legal Realist fashion, as the creation of the right.
124 Transfers require a healthy market. To preserve the health of the
market requires a law of corporations, antitrust, and so forth.
125 Archaic environmental law attempts to recover a functional market;
classical environmental law attempts to simulate an efficient market; modern
environmental law attempts
to create an accurate market.
7
767
126 42 U.S.C. §§ 401lq (1988 & Supp. 1992).
127 The CAA also allows emissions banking. Some of the incentive systems
"under" the CAA have been devised largely by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 845 (1984), reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984) (affirming validity of
EPA's decision to employ bubbles).
128 See generally Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Ester, Marketable Permits:
Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 EcoLoGY L.Q. 361 (1989) (disussing offset
trading).
129 42 U.S.C. § 7503(c) (Supp. 1992).
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offset entitlements will allow pollution to be reduced on a least-cost
basis.
The 1990 CAA amendments13 0 apply this offset approach to the
problem of sulfur dioxide (SO 2) deposition. As amended, the CAA
provides a tradeable permit system for electric power plants that
emit S02. EPA will issue a fixed number of permits to existing
plants. 13

All plants must have a permit to operate.132 These per-

mits are freely exchangeable between plants, thus providing the
means for a market for pollution rights and increasing incentives
for plants to reduce their own emissions. EPA will oversee a systematic reduction in the total number of permits over a period of years.
Both the offset program and the SO 2 permit program illustrate
the close relation between regulation and entitlement. The entitlements established by EPA are rather intangible forms of property.
They establish rights enforceable against EPA itself. EPA will not
allow the polluting activity unless a plant has a permit. Not coincidentally, the CAA entitlement programs have been established in
situations where classical regulation would have been relatively easy.
The offset program applies to large, stationary sources, and the new
S02 regime applies primarily to public utilities. Such enterprises
are amenable to regulation-EPA can monitor their activities and
understands the relevant technologies. Also, these enterprises have
a long history of government involvement. Entitlements may be a
more efficient way to achieve environmental ends. However, at
least as demonstrated by the CAA, entitlements do not offer clear
130

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549 (codified as

amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7 4 01- 76 7 1q (1988 & Supp. 1992)). The Clean Air
Act amendments of 1990 "easily represent the most significant legislation ever
passed to control air pollution." Warren H. Husband, Comment, New
Approaches and New Polluters: The PracticalImpact of the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 861 (1992). Already, the literature is
correspondingly vast. Because of the CAA's impact on business, the American
Bar Association and the Practicing Law Institute have published innumerable
pieces for practitioners. Significant academic contributions include: John P.
Dwyer, The Use of Market Incentives in Controlling Air Pollution: California's
Marketable Permits Program, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 103 (1993); Symposium,
Proceedings andPapers of the Conference on EnvironmentalLaw: Air Pollution Control
in the 1990s-Learning from Past Mistakes, 1990 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 13;
Symposium, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L. 1549 (1991);
HenryJ. Handzel, Jr., The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 64 Wis. L., May 1991,
at 14.
'31 40 C.F.R. § 73.70(c) (1992). Sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) is a leading cause of
acid rain.
132 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(a) (Supp. 1992).
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guidance on how to bring problems within the ambit of environmental law which have not been amenable to classical regulation.
Typical of modem environmental law, the issuance of entitlements
not only constitutes an alternative to classical regulation, but also
33
deepens EPA's administrative reach.1
An incentive system with more widespread potential is taxation.
Taxes are primarily considered a means for raising revenue, and
only secondarily a means for governance. Every tax produces a distortion because rational individuals will avoid the tax. Generally,
socially approved activities (making money, holding property) have
been taxed, and so attempts to avoid the tax are viewed as unfortunate side effects of the government's need for revenue. The great
exceptions are sin taxes such as those on alcohol and tobacco,
which are intended to discourage use of the harmful product as
well as to raise revenue. Reduction in the use of tobacco is considered a proper governmental purpose, rather than a distortion of a
beneficial market.
Modern environmental law considers sin taxes a model for governmental activity in a market. For modern environmental law,
taxes are primarily a means of governance, and only secondarily a
means for raising revenue. Rather than producing an unfortunate
distortion, the tax actively shapes a market by inhibiting an undesirable state of affairs. Despite considerable theoretical discussion,
there is no good example of a national statute that uses taxation for
environmental ends.134 However, in theory, and in very limited
practice, there are three approaches to setting an environmental
133 The CAA does not clearly address a number of problems particular to
entitlements. Because it applies to relatively few producers, who were in some
degree consigned to being regulated, the CAA largely avoids what may be the
largest political problem in establishing an entitlement system: difficulties with
the fair distribution of the resource. Despite the various problems involving
political lobbying over the issue of soft coal/hard coal, the CAA involves a
relatively small number of actors operating in a well-defined legal system. The
problems attendant to more ambitious entitlement systems, such as
combatting global climate change, are exponentially more complex.
Another pollution market will develop in California's South Coast Air
Quality Management District (SCAQMD). The SCAQMD has developed a
smog market in which businesses can trade pollution allocations. Maria Cone,
Smog Market Set to Open in Southland, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1993, at Al; see
Gregory J. Wilcox, Smog-Credits Auction Postponed, L.A. DAILY NEws, Dec. 28,
1993, at 1 (noting that auction was postponed from Jan. 10 to Mar. 24, 1994).
134 One might add that various penalty schedules are in effect taxes.
Neither fees nor fines, unless set with a view to a particular environmental
result, constitute a tax in the proactive sense used here.
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tax, which may be roughly categorized according to how they are
set.
The first and most ambitious approach is to imagine a state of the
world, and then to create a tax structure that provides the incentives for private actors to bring about this state of the world. The
problem here is finding the correct quantum for the tax. An excessive tax causes inefficient behavior as taxpayers struggle to avoid the
tax at the cost of some beneficial activity. Yet an inadequate tax is
ignored or accepted as a cost by the taxpayer, and the desired result
is not attained. If the desired result is as complicated as a given
level of ambient air pollution, setting a tax may be impossible,
because it requires the taxing agent to make a "cost of abatement"
calculation for each business. The costs of gathering and processing so much data are enormous, and results obtained from such
calculations are necessarily provisional. When the tax rate becomes
effective, business 'behavior changes. As the calculations setting the
tax become obsolete, officials find it increasingly difficult to make
predictions of any sort, and unintended distortions are inevitable.
The second type of tax uses the cost of an activity to set the level
of the tax. For example, an effluent tax is imposed on firms that
discharge into the Emscher river, a tributary of the Rhine. The tax
money is used to pay for a water treatment plant at the juncture of
the Rhine and the Emscher. The rate of the tax is a function of the
costs of the plant." 5 In the United States, the rapid rise of fees for
the disposal of waste have a dampening effect on the production of
waste. Although generally not collected by the state, and generally
not set with a view to optimal levels of production of waste or long
term land use, such fees do imperfectly reflect the cost of waste
disposal. An increasing amount of work is being done on environmental accounting, which attempts to ascertain the diffuse and
long-term costs of various activities."3 6 At least theoretically, such
135 See ZygmuntJ.B. Plater, Coal Law from the Old World: A Perspectiveon Land
Use and Environmental Regulation in the Coal Industries of the United States, Great
Britain, and West Germany, 64 Ky. L.J. 473, 477 (1976). Note that the cost of
running the treatment plant is simply equated with the cost of the damage. So
the river Emscher, which runs dirty until its juncture with the Rhine, and the
pollutants that the treatment plant fails to remove and that are dumped into
the Rhine, are not costs.
136 Although the difficulties of environmental valuation are obvious, the
law seems to be trending towards requiring such valuation. See Colorado v.
Department of Interior, 880 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (allowing
environmental trustees to demand replacement costs); Ohio v. Department of
Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 897 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir.
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work suggests the possibility of using taxes to internalize all significant costs of an activity in the price of the product. Although distributional problems would remain, the result would be an allocatively
7
3

true market.1

The third approach to environmental taxation sets the tax in
hopes of encouraging some change for the better, but without worrying about the precise contours of the goal or the exact costs of
the undesirable behavior. This approach resembles sin taxes most
closely. It may be difficult to imagine the optimal relationship
between a culture with wine and a society with cirrohsis, but many
polities place some tax, usually flat, on alcohol. The most discussed
examples of such taxes in the environmental context are the gasoline tax suggested most famously by Vice President Gore13 8 and the

1989) (striking down regulations establishing CERCLA damages as the lesser
of restoration or replacement costs). In the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill,
Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 494
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 2706(e)(1) (1986)), which imposed a
requirement that natural resources be valued in the event of an oil spill. See
generally Symposium, Oil Pollution Act Rulemaking, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 215
(1993).
Over the last few years, important work toward developing a system of
environmental accounting has been done under the auspices of the World
Bank. See, e.g., ERNST LUTz & SALAH EL SERAFY, ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE
ACCOUNTING: AN OVERVIEW (World Bank, Environment Dept. Working Paper
No. 6, June 1988); MOHAN MUNASINGHE & ERNST LuTz, ENVIRONMENTALECONOMIC

EVALUATION

OF

PROJECTS

AND

POLICIES

FOR

SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT (World Bank, Environment Working Paper No. 42, Jan. 1991);
HENRY PESKIN & ERNST LUTZ, A SURVEY OF RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
ACCOUNTING IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTImES (World Bank, Environmental
Working Paper No. 37, Aug. 1990); HENRY M. PESKIN, ACCOUNTING FOR
NATURAL RESOURCE DEPLETION AND DEGREDATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

(World Bank, Environment Dept. Working Paper No. 13, Jan. 1989).
137 See Ernst U. von Weizsacker, Prices Should Tell the Ecological Truth,
(May 8-12, 1990) (paper given at Conference on Sustainable Development:
Science and Policy, Bergen, Norway) (on file with author). "Bureaucratic
socialism collapsed because it did not allow prices to tell the economic truth.
Market economy may ruin the environment and ultimately itself if prices are
not allowed to tell the ecological truth." Obviously, the practical and
theoretical barriers to using a tax or some other mechanism to provide true
pricing are overwhelming. The perfect is the enemy of the good, however,
and taxes can make prices more accurate than they otherwise are.
138 See Michael Arndt, Clinton Revises Energy Tax Plan, CHI. TRIB., June 9,

1993, at News 1 (discussing Vice President Gore's plan to base energy taxes on
fuel carbon content).
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proposed European Community "carbon tax." 13 9 Both taxes are
designed to combat global climate change. Neither tax has been
implemented, so discussion of their effects is premature. Yet, as
proposed, they both lack the detailed calculus of the cost of abatement required for an optimally efficient tax. This may be entirely
necessary. We have little quantified knowledge of how anthropogenic carbon output affects the climate. Consequently, we cannot
know the substance of the tradeoff between activities that contribute to global warming and environmental quality. There seems to
be good reason, however, to think carbon output is too high, and
that it should be discouraged. By setting a tax, and observing the
effects on both social activities and the environment, we can work
towards a better state of the world while better understanding our
choices.
Each taxation alternative has a different functional identity. The
first type-setting a tax to attain a specific state of the world-is
executive. The political process, presumably through a legislature,
chooses a desired future, and then expresses the desire through
legislation. The tax realizes an ideal established by the political system. The second type of tax, which uses remedial costs to approximate the costs of harm, is economic. The tax facilitates the
functioning of the market by improving the accuracy of its price
signals. In contrast to the first type of tax, the market is the mechanism of social choice, not the political system. The third type of
tax, which provides incentives to move society toward a preferred
state, is also economic. But because it distorts existing markets to
generate information about social preferences, this type of tax has a
legislative bent. The tax uses the marketplace not just to process
information, but also to generate information about possible
futures facing the society. If taxes raise gasoline costs to five dollars
a gallon, preferences regarding public transportation, automobiles
for teenagers, or for living fifteen miles from work, may change
along with air quality. The tax thus adds nuance to private and
societal considerations regarding the balance between clean air and
automobile use. The distinction between executive, economic, and
legislative taxes helps clarify the justification for environmental
140
taxes within modem environmental law.
139 See Bill Mintz, Energy Taxes to Put OPECon Defensive, Hous. CHRON., May
19, 1993, at Business 2 (discussing proposed European Community carbon

tax).
This Article has focused on the creation of entitlements and taxes
because they are the most obviously market-oriented ways to effect
140
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More generally, this political approach to market construction
helps explain the earlier stages of environmental law, archaic environmental law and classical environmental law, in the terms of constructed markets in modern environmental law. Properly
constructed tort and regulatory regimes contribute to the appropriate internalization of costs, and can therefore be understood not
only as legal expressions of government, but also as ways of informing the market. A typology of modern environmental law would
discuss all the ways law establishes the context for decentralized
activity in the marketplace. A theory of modern environmental governance would be able to organize these techniques into a body of
practical wisdom.
C.

The Invention of Nature

The opposition between nature and culture is one of the major
ways in which Western cultures have understood their world and
themselves. The tension between ideas of nature and culture has
played a large role in America, a nation formed by people who
imagined themselves imposing culture upon the terrain of
nature.' 4 ' Certainly by the nineteenth century, this enterprise was
questioned by those who saw value in nature, or who wished to criticize American culture, which was radically transforming the land.
environmental policy, but policymakers can also resort to other incentive
approaches not discussed here. For example, this Article has not discussed
environmental labeling. See, e.g.,Jamie A. Grodsky, ertified Green: The Law and
Future of Environmental Labeling, 10 YALE J. ON REG'N 147 (1993) (discussing

environmental labeling); Ciannat M. Howett, Note: The "Green Labeling"
Phenomenon: Problems and Trends in the Regulation of Environmental Product

Claims, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 401 (1992). For another example, this Article has
not discussed deposit systems, which are useful to control litter and may have
other uses. Deposits are a tax on modes of disposal other than returning the
item. Deposits do not seem like taxes because they are collected to ensure the
return of consumer items, ranging from used film cartridges to household
utilities. In certain circumstances, the item's return might be inconvenient.
Deposits on soft drink bottles work well in part because return points are
widespread. As the difficulty of returning an item increased, the tax on
improper disposal would have to increase to provide sufficient deterrence.
Disclosure requirements, such as those mandated by various state and
federal statutes, and labeling, such as that mandated by the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), also facilitate the flow of
information. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136-136y (1988).
141 See Mark Sagoff, On Preservingthe NaturalEnvironment, 84 YALE L.J. 205
(1974).
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The American environmental consciousness-and hence indirectly
the law-was formed by a long succession of writers like Thoreau,
Muir, Leopold, Carson, and McKibben. 1 42 These writers adopted
an informed ideal of nature as a critical stance. From their perspective, nature was something that needed protection and preservation
from the ravages of American enterprise. The preservationist
instinct reflected a sense of piety toward nature, a sense that nature
is valuable for reasons that have nothing to do with humanity. The
preservationist claim was also political. Preservationists maintained
that the splendor of the continent was a part of the American heritage. They believed nature needed to be preserved as a sphere
outside human activity. Nature was like history, a sphere within
which a nation defined itself."' Because much recent American
history had been about the taming and channeling of the great
land, and the reaping of its bounties, Americans needed to be
144
understood-or criticized-in terms of their natural heritage,
that is, their great common experience. The preservationist movement was informed by the dialogical ideal of nature as the nation's
nature be preserved as a
interlocutor, a belief which required1 4that
5
sphere distinct from human activity.
142

See, e.g., RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962); LEOPOLD, supra note 84;
supra note 82; JOHN MUIR, WILDERNESS ESSAYS (Peregrine Smith

MCKiBBEN,

Books ed.) (1985) HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN; OR, LIFE IN THE WOODS
(1854) reprinted in THE ANNOTATED WALDEN (Philip Stern ed., 1970).
148 Indeed, the forerunner of today's ecology is natural history, which
contains accounts of how things happen in the natural world. The most
famous American natural historians are probably John James Audubon and

William Bartram. Daniel Boorstin maintains that the American experience is
particularly congenial to the pursuit of natural history. DANIEL J. BOORsTIN,
THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 164-68 (1958). This consciousness
of nature, history, and identity is also amply illustrated by American landscape

painting, in which the drama traditionally if not exclusively associated with
history paintings is lavished on celebrations of the American land.
144 See Sagoff, supra note 141, at 232.
In imposing civilization on so vast a landscape, Americans were, in
fact, doing what had never been done. They had a mission-if not
the one that brought them-and the world watched. And they
had become conscious of new symbols, stories, and beliefs and so
had begun to unite themselves, without relying on the traditions,
memories, and myths of their European origins. In a word,
Americans started to describe nature in a way that could help them
describe themselves.
Id.
145

The preservation movement illustrates the difference between the

logical progression around which this paper is constructed and the actual
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Early on, preservationists were challenged by conservationists
who believed in the protection of natural resources against mismanagement. At stake was the disposition of lands acquired through
the westward expansion of the nation. Conservationists advocated
the management of one-time wilderness not for its own sake, or out
of a romantic understanding of a mystical discourse between the
American people and their antecedent environment, but to promote the economic health of the nation. Conservationists did not
dispute the importance of using the land, but they wished to see the
land used wisely. Conservationists have been more politically successful. Throughout American history, the disposition of federal
lands has favored development, and successful environmental
efforts have required conservation, rather than preservation. Even
so, the preservationists have not been wholly unsuccessful. For
instance, in 1891 Congress authorized the President to set aside
public reservations-that is, to remove land from development.1 4 6
Yet in 1897, Congress restricted the President's ability to reserve
land, thereby reinforcing the development-oriented land use
regime in place and supporting the notion that limitations were to
be placed on that regime according to the prudence of conservation rather than the piety of preservation. 147 Preservationist and
conservationist impulses have remained strong throughout the
twentieth century, with both affecting modern land policy. The legacy of these conflicting ethics has been the establishment of the
national parks and the wilderness areas, guided by preservationist
principles, while everything else, most notably the national forests,
was guided by conservationist principles.'
The preservationist ethic maintains that nature is intrinsically
important, and that law should be written around nature. The
commitment to a substantive environmental law, however, underwrites very little environmental law. Instead, the environment is

sequence of history. As a matter of history, an explicitly environmental legal
consciousness first appears in legislation, not adjudication. At issue for the
preservationists was the fate of wilderness, and they sought to protect
wilderness through the legislature, not the courts.
146 Creative Act of 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1103 (1891).
147 Organic Administration Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1988).
148 The legislative history of the National Park System, the National Forest
System, and public lands in general, is labyrinthine. See generallyJOSEPH SAX,
MOUNTAINS

(1980).

WITHOUT

HANDRAILS:

REFLECTIONS

ON

THE NATIONAL

PARKS
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usually represented by proxy and thus figures only indirectly.' 49
Even in instances involving federal lands, where the government
often acts in a proprietary manner and so worries less about coercing civil society, the government has seldom maintained that the
land has intrinsic value. Instead the government has generally
adopted a 0conservationist approach that land is no more than a
15
resource.
Nonetheless, the preservationist impulse has engendered important environmental legislation, for example the Endangered Species Act and the Wilderness Act.15 1 Such statutes require that our
legal system take account of nature's intrinsic value. Even more
importantly, the preservationist impulse has inspired an important
part of American environmental law. Although environmental law
is a system of proxies, the environmental concerns represented by
proxy are themselves significant. The fact that the Clean Air Act is
conceived in terms of externalities-harms inflicted on individuals-does not mean that its drafters, or enforcers, do not care about
clean air. For most of U.S. environmental law, the preservation of
nature is merely a notional presence, but that presence informs the
way environmental law has been constructed.
Although the preservationist perspective has generally been a
minority position, the question is whether or not it is currently a
defensible position at all. Technology has made management ubiquitous, so the law has no place for the alien nature revered by
preservationists. If modern environmental law proves successful,
the opposition between nature and culture will be dissolved.
149 "Natural rights" arguments that support the substantive value of the
environment for its own sake have rarely justified legal action, and are unlikely
to in the foreseeable future. See RODERICK NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE
(1989).
150 Although one can point to preservationist statutes, the general attitude
of the federal government toward the land has been exploitative. Findley and
Farber write of the nonenvironmental scheme governing public lands, and
remark that "[h]istorically, resource development on public lands has been the
rule rather than the exception. Most public land law was geared toward
encouraging resource development, while preservation. was an exception."
FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 5, at 754, 757. The President's authority to

withdraw public land from development has been upheld by the Supreme

Court. United States v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459 (1915). See generally GIFORD
PINCHOT, THE FIGHT FOR CONSERVATION (1910) (discussing withdrawl of
public land).
151 Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1988); Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44.
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Nature as something outside society to be engaged, conquered, preserved, worshiped, and contemplated, will become man-made, fostered by the declaration of entitlements or other market-shaping
environmental activity. Nature's construction will take place either
by declaring a realm apart from the flux of the markets, a natural
theme park, or by structuring markets for a particular result. For
example, as the Clean Air Act takes effect, the "natural" state of the
air we breathe will be mandated by legislation.
With the dissolution of the opposition between nature and culture, much that we looked to nature to find, a sense of wildness,
humility, irrationality, mystery, or religion, may be found in the
unpredictable combinations of markets. Just as society once moved
from external religion to internal psychology, it may again move
from the unknowable outside human agency to the unknowable
vagaries of aggregate human preference, from the mysteries of the
cosmos to the mysteries of fashion. One of the fashions may well be
for wild things, and presumably, markets will be used to distribute
outdoor goods.15 2 As once people walked out back into the woods,

they will now scuba dive off the Thai island of Phuket."5 ' But one
wonders how successful the market could possibly be in providing
the sublime.'
152 The provision of biology through the workings of culture creates
further problems, some of which are beginning to receive the attention of the
legal community. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp.
753 (D.D.C. 1984), affd in part and vacated in part, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir.
1985); see Gregory Aplet & Marc Miller, BiologicalControl: A Little Knowledge is a
Dangerous Thing, 45 RUrGERs L.J. 285 (1993); Ferretti, supra note 58; Thomas
0. McGarity & Kari 0. Bayer, FederalRegulation of Emerging Genetic Technologies,
36 VAND. L. REv. 461 (1983).
153

Phuket is an island in Thailand, an exotic place to vacation, featured in

the James Bond movie The Man with the Golden Gun.
154 See, e.g., ANDERSON & L.L, supra note 121, at 34.

Some environmental groups have proposed that wolves be reintroduced into Yellowstone National Park, but ranchers oppose
the plan because they fear that the wolves will leave the park and
prey on livestock. Could the wolves be fenced? Technology is
currently available for "fencing" dogs by burying a cable that emits
a radio signal on the perimeter of a piece of land; the signal,
received in the dog's collar, shocks the animal, which then retreats
from the perimeter. Could the same technology be applied to
wolves? When red wolves were reintroduced into South Carolina
wildlands, they were equipped with radio collars that allow the
animals to be tracked. If a wolf wanders too far afield, a radio
activated collar injects the animal with a tranquilizing drug so that
it can be returned to its designated habitat.
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If we lose our idea of nature, we may lose more than environmental amenities.' 55 This is particularly true in America, where wilderness and its conquest have occupied so much of our energies. Our
natural heritage must be explored if we are to make sense out of
the living brutality-and the grandeur-of our history. Without
Id. The call of the wild, indeed.
155 The thorough-going humanist, like the thorough-going economist, may
be untroubled by this prospect.
What's wrong with plastic trees? My guess is that there is very little
wrong with them. Much more can be done with plastic trees and
the like to give most people the feeling that they are experiencing
nature. We will have to realize that the way in which we
experience nature is conditioned by our society-which more and
more is seen to be receptive to responsible inventions.
Martin H. Krieger, What's Wrong with Plastic Trees?, 179 Sci. 446, 453 (1973).

With his very title Krieger extends utilitarian argument to the point of absurdity. Less obvious is how Krieger's utilitarian argument is implicit in, and
infects, intentionally "pro-environmental" arguments for environmental rights
such as those offered by Stone and Tribe. See Toward Legal Rights, supra note

38; Lawrence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundationsfor
EnvironmentalLaw, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974). These arguments are fundamentally flawed in their attempt to phrase concerns for the external environment
in terms of internal desires. This contradiction leads to no end of problems,
notably the assumption that "nature" somehow "desires" to remain wild, as
skewered by Sagoff:
Nature is a war of each against all, as Hobbes said, and man and
beast alike prefer the safety and comfort of an artificial environment. . . Why wouldn't Mineral King want to host a ski resort,
after doing nothing for a billion years?. . .The Sequoia National
Forest tells the developer that it wants a ski lift by a certain declivity
of its hills and snowiness during the winter-immediately obvious
to the sight-and that it needs a four lane highway by the appearance of certain valley passages and obvious scenic turnouts on the
mountainsides.
Sagoff, supra note 141, at 222. The problem with Stone's and Tribe's argument is akin to, but different from, the problem that I used to organize environmental law. Stone's and Tribe's position is ultimately utilitarian; liberal
environmental jurisprudence is founded on a notion of morality that is
expressly anti-utilitarian. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON,
(Lewis W. Beck trans., 3d ed. 1993) (1788) (providing foundational principles
of liberal jurisprudence). As this Article argues below, however, this difference does not protect liberal environmental jurisprudence from the errors
Sagoff describes. Sagoff is therefore ultimately correct to turn to history and
aesthetics. My differences with Sagoff are essentially practical; I think there is
more to be gained by organizing environmental law around doctrinaire liberalism than he apparently does.
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that self-knowledge, it is difficult to know not only how to structure
environmental law, but also how to legislate at all.
V.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN LIGHT OF LIBERALISM

A.

The Liberal Structure of Environmental Law

The preceding ideal history organizes environmental law by
presenting it as a set of legal responses to environmental concerns.
The substance of the responses, and the way the different responses
relate to each other, reveal the commitments of our legal culture.
The first stage, archaic environmental law, emphasizes the individual as the locus of environmental harms. By focusing on infringements of individual rights, more generally through emphasizing
diminution of individual liberty as a precondition for adjudication,
archaic environmental law translates environmental concerns into
the language of individual rights used by the common law. Nature
is peripheral to the conflict in archaic environmental law.
The second stage, classical environmental law, requires collective
government action. Classical environmental law focuses on legislation and administration rather than adjudication, and on collective
responses to large scale problems rather than resolving conflicts
between individuals. Classical environmental law does not conceive
of the government's authority to regulate as a prerequisite for environmental law, a preliminary matter to be discussed as a preface to
the real issues.15 6 Instead, the social authority for environmental
law is derived from society's felt need for legislation. The government's authority is therefore not prior to, but created by, the popular realization that individuals acting on their own cannot solve
their environmental problems.157Classical environmental law thus
produces a theory of the state.
This is in marked contrast to environmental law texts. See, e.g.,
supra note 46; BONINE & McGARiTy, supra note 6; FINDLEY &
FARBER, supranote 5; PLATER ET AL., supranote 9. Each of these books devotes
chapter(s) to government regulatory powers and judicial review powers before
tackling the substance of environmental law.
157 Many readers are no doubt aware that I have merely recapitulated the
Hobbesian progression from the state of nature toward modernity in the
context of environmental concerns. This entire story could be repeated in an
international context. The safety of the international environment cannot be
assured by the actions of individual states; collective action is required.
International environmental law does not "fit in" with the story I tell
throughout this article. Instead, it is a retelling of the same story on the
international, as opposed to the municipal, plane.
156

ANDERSON ET AL.,
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Although classical environmental law moves away from the preoccupations of archaic environmental law, most of the classical statutes are justified in terms of market failure.15 By using market
failure to justify government action, classical environmental law
reasserts the normative primacy of the market. The insistence on
the idea that value is internal to the individual has two important
results. First, the internal character of value means that all value is
politically determined. There are no conceptual limits on collective action regarding the environment.' 59 A managerial, even triumphal, view of humanity's role on the planet emerges, and with it,
the distinction between nature and culture disappears. Second,
governance is defined as a matter of attempting to insure the maximum level of real autonomy. The major environmental cases,
which add nuance to the classical statutes, serve to articulate the
limited social scope and the proper organization of government. 6 '
Unlike archaic or classical environmental law, the third stage,
modern environmental law, acts through, rather than in response
to, the marketplace. Modern environmental law's moment of governance, when government action takes place, is the establishment
of a market, which means that modern environmental law is intrinsically committed to the market. The collapse of the distinction
between markets and politics, the idea that political ends can be
pursued through economic means, has meant that the values of the
marketplace have penetrated the values of governance. The ideas
of political and economic autonomy, which had been conceived distinctly, are now virtually indistinguishable.

158 There is a certain anachronism in my entire argument. Many of the
great statutes were passed in the name of substantively environmental values.
But Marxism was then a viable philosophy and arguments that worked then do
not work now. My effort is to organize environmental law in the face of the
virtual hegemony of doctrinaire liberalism, particularly given the success of
economic thinking in law.
159 Political only in the modern sense, as the aggregation of individual
preference.
16o The great statutes thereby aggravated the anxiety about the use of
governmental power inherent in classical environmental law. This anxiety
stems from simultaneous recognition of environmental law's coercive quality
coupled with a belief that the personal liberty of market behavior is more
important than the collective liberty of governments. Classical environmental
law is thus preoccupied with whether or not its diagnosis of market failure is
correct. This preoccupation makes it increasingly less likely that a
substantively environmental argument can prevail.
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Considered collectively and systematically, the political commitments of all three stages of U.S. environmental law can only be
described as liberal. The word "liberal" has served many masters,
and little consensus exists on the details of its meaning.'
This
Article adopts a simple working definition of liberalism: liberalism
is a social theory built upon the value of autonomy, which is the
individual's capacity to make choices.' 6 2 In the liberal view, each
individual knows what is best for her. This is not because each individual has better information about what is best for her (though few
liberals would deny this) but because statements of value-what is
best-are ultimately statements of personal opinion. Liberalism,
considered most broadly, is the argument that social processes
should be established through which individuals have the opportunity to make their own choices. The realm in which such choices
are made is called the sphere of individual autonomy.
Liberalism requires mechanisms to protect the sphere of autonomy against invasion by other individuals or by the state. The exercise of one person's will may limit the autonomy of another
individual. Proverbially, your right to swing your fist ends where my
nose begins, and your right to discharge waste ends where my
intake pipe begins.' 63 Even though the state may invade individual
161 Many scholars offer richer notions of liberalism than the one I use here.
Most currently trenchant ideas of liberalism may be reduced to the moral
individual of Kant's Groundwork to a Metaphysics of Morals, Metaphysics of Morals,

and Critique of Moral Reason, largely familiar from John Rawls' A Theory ofJustice
and the economic individual of Hobbes's Leviathan and Adam Smith's The
Wealth of Nations. This is a bit unfair, both to the fonts of the liberal tradition
and to contemporary scholarship. For example, FRANcIs FUKUYAMA, THE END
OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992), uses Hegelian ideas of liberalism, and
his arguments differ importantly from those derived from Kant or Hobbes.
Similarly, RONALD DwoRKN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986), cannot be easily classified
as an expression of one or the other kind of liberalism. Nonetheless, I believe
these are the scholarly exceptions that prove the political rule.
162 A more complex definition of liberalism would not add much to this
particular argument. Additionally, it would have the grave drawback of raising
more objections, thereby distracting attention from my main argument.
Therefore, this Article defines liberalism in minimal, yet serviceable, fashion.
163 A full-fledged theory of liberalism would have to develop a more
rigorous notion of rights, and would have to discuss the relationship between
fundamental rights and the rights granted merely as a matter of statute. That
discussion is necessarily abstract, and can be omitted here in the interest of
this Article's main points. Consequently, the term "rights" is used in the
familiar multivalent, even sloppy fashion. See generally RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIcHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). For a doctrinaire version of my political
thinking on this matter see Westbrook, supra note 113.
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autonomy, for instance through regulating the use of private property, the liberal state promises to protect the individual's autonomy
from both other individuals and from the state itself. Liberal government therefore requires the rule of law, binding even upon the
state, as a guarantee for the state's promise not to violate individual
autonomy. Within the area in which the state cannot legally act
and other individuals are not permitted to interfere, the individual
is free to make choices. So, in the absence of a legal prohibition
one is free to pollute.
Liberalism has emphasized autonomy in a variety of human
affairs, but the two areas most relevant to environmental law are
politics and economics. This Article presumes that political action
is legitimate."6 4 In liberal societies, economic activity is also presumed legitimate. Economic activity can be illegitimate, however,
when it unduly burdens another by limiting the autonomy of
another individual. For instance, a plastics company conducts a
legitimate activity when it opens a new manufacturing facility, even
a facility that pollutes, but acts illegitimately when it poisons the
local water table. Liberal environmental law is a debate over
whether or not a particular economic activity unduly restricts the
autonomy of another individual." 5
Although based on individual autonomy, political and economic
liberalism both have public consequences. Government action,
which liberalism characterizes as the collective action of a nation's
individuals, is one way in which a society achieves its ends, including
the protection of the environment. Collective private action
through the marketplace is another way society achieves its ends,
classically, the distribution of goods and services. For example, the
supply of automobiles in the United States, with the attendant network of roads, reflects a collective decision taken primarily through
the market, and not through government.
As most environmental cases illustrate, markets and legislatures
frequently produce mutually exclusive outcomes. Conflicts emerge
between economic liberalism, which uses markets as the context for
public choice, and political liberalism, which relies on consent, usu164 This assumption. is convenient but not necessary. The problem of
illegitimate government action does arise in environmental law, for example
in the consideration of takings claims. Generally, however, the political
debates in environmental law concern appropriate policies, not basic issues of
legitimacy.
165 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing environmental

justice).
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ally through the mechanism of a democratically elected legislature.
Despite mutually exclusive outcomes, both processes are justified
within liberal thought as collective expressions of the value choices
made by individuals. The task of the political economy of environmental law is to decide among legitimate mechanisms of public
choice.
B.

The PoliticalEconomy of Environmental Law

This Article shows that the problems in each stage of environmental law are addressed and partially remedied by the next stage.
So problems of externalities and diffuse harms endemic to nuisance are addressed by the emergence of regulation; problems of
information, creativity, and efficiency inherent in bureaucracy are
addressed by constructed markets. In each stage, government corrects the failings of the market by operating through environmental
law. Conversely, the market is transformed by the process of governance. The "natural" market, to which no law is applied, is remedied by the tort regime; the "simple" market, where the common
law system fails to provide a remedy, is addressed by regulation; and
the "modem" market, where administrative regulation proves too
cumbersome to provide the sophisticated controls demanded by
technological innovation, is constructed by modern environmental
law. Each type of market requires its own type of governance.
From the act of governance a new type of market emerges, requiring a new form of governance.
It would be a mistake to limit each conceptualization of liberal
environmental law to replacing the preceding one.1 66 Environmental law has often been reimagined, most recently in terms of economic incentives and the decentralization of politics, but tort and
administrative law are still integral to modem environmental law.
Tort and regulation have not remained, however, in the form in
which they were originally introduced. Instead, archaic and classical modes of environmental law are put to modem uses. Property
rights are today defined both by the liability regimes of archaic environmental law and the regulatory imperatives of classical environ166

My

argument is

essentially Hegelian.

We

can understand

environmental law if we imagine it as an ideal history through which we move.
Later stages in the story do not invalidate earlier stages; narrative, even logical
narrative, is a cumulative form of understanding. In Hegelian terms, the

process of sublation (Aufhebung) retains its occasion. See, e.g., HEGEL,
PHILOSOPY OF RIGHT 32 (T.M. Knox trans., 1942) (1821) (discussing
subjectivity and objectivity).
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mental law. Conversely, the problem of designing markets by
creating new property rights entails assumptions about tort liability
and regulatory obligations.16 7 Liberal environmental jurisprudence, encompassing all of these perspectives and concerns, thus
raises the question of doctrine: how do the techniques for structuring a market interact? 68
The doctrinal effort involved in reconciling these techniques is
enormous, and requires no less than reimagining the problem of
governance. 6 9 One way to structure the problem is to consider the
moment of governance. This Article structures environmental law
around the temporal attitude of the legislator: archaic environmental law looks to the past; classical environmental law looks at the
present (more precisely, is atemporal); and modem environmental
law looks to the future. Liberal environmental jurisprudence subsumes these various tenses into an ideal future, the purposive tense
of normative debate. But even within the forward-looking perspective in which this doctrinal discussion takes place, one can find
these various temporal attitudes. It is still possible to detect different relationships between the moment of governance and the constraints on the market, and between the legislator's rationality and
the expectations of the governed.
A liability regime adjusts existing entitlements. For example, a
factory might be strictly liable for all harms resulting from its activities. Liability does not occur until after the fact of harm. Consequently, the liability rule tends to allow freedom of action up until
the moment of judgment. The factory may adopt any of several
policies to cope with expected liability. A regulatory regime, associated with classical environmental law, encumbers existing property
rights. Though a regulation is usually a general statement, the
effect of the statement is often fairly specific, and may impose a
given level of pollution, or even type of technology. The regulator's

167 Rephrased, the ex post perspective of archaic law and the atemporal
perspective of classical law are yoked to the ex ante concerns of modern
environmental law-the problem of designing good markets.
168 The coalescence of liberal environmental jurisprudence also raises a
further speculation: what will the next stage of legal environmental thought
be like? What are the inconsistencies and inadequacies within modern
environmental law which need to be addressed?
169 See Richard Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REv. 86 (1986)
(discussing the enormity of the task).
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attitude is atemporal. Both liability and regulatory regimes
attach
1 70
to property rights that are defined outside the regime.
The enterprise of creating new entitlements is prospective. The
moment of governance occurs with the declaration of the entitlement, not with subsequent market activity that uses the entitlement.
The entitlement fixes a part of the world, and allows the market1 to
71
form around the expectation that this part will remain fixed.
Taxation is the converse of the creation of an entitlement. Taxation inhibits an activity that has not yet begun, so it governs a state
of the world that does not yet exist. More subtly, legislative taxation
can be used to defer the moment of governance, by using the market to pose questions that legislatures and bureaucracies have
trouble formulating. For example, a tax may show how to strike the
balance between the benefits of automobile use and environmental
harm from that use. Both the legislation of entitlements and taxation must be perfected by market activity subsequent to the
moment of governance.
The problem of structuring a market precludes any notion that a
market is literally prior to politics. 172 In a constructed market, public rationality must precede the incentive-driven market. Although
some arguments from law and economics attempt to minimize the
"interference" of legal structures with economic transactions, economic transactions cannot be understood without legal structures.
The most obvious examples are contract and property, but liability
and regulatory regimes figure more prominently in the environmental arena. In recent years, efforts to privatize occasioned by the
collapse of applied Marxism have been seen as vindication of capitalist modes of public choice across a broad spectrum of issues. But
insofar as Eastern Europe and other areas of the world ought to
adopt more economically rational structures of public choice, the
170 An injunction can be a hybrid, a regulation administered by an
adjudicatory institution.
171 While there are few existing environmental examples of this process,
the process of creating a market for previously nonexistent entitlements is
central to patent law, and enables the establishment of complex markets in
rights to use intellectual property, i.e., licenses. In this context, the vital policy
issue is how to shape the patent right in order to engender the optimal
market. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 868-69 (1990).
172 This Article argues that markets are prior to politics in another sense:
markets precede governance in the narrative this Article uses to organize
environmental law. It is important, however, to distinguish narrative, and
hence conceptual, priority from actual or normative priority.
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creation of markets becomes a political question and a challenge
for governance.
As a matter of governing our relationship to the environment,
economics and politics interpenetrate one another. Although it is
difficult to speak of a difference between the two, in a fundamental
sense the dialectic employed here has been essentially economic
rather than political. Psychologically, the argument has not presumed motives other than those of self-interested individuals atomistically conceived. ' Institutionally, markets have been privileged
over legislatures as modes of public choice. Substantively, positions
that could not be squared with market choices, such as the
preservationist movement, have been ignored or branded as essentially illiberal, even if they emerged from liberal political processes.
Politics reacts to situations created by economic forces; the impetus
for each stage of the argument is economic in nature. Although
idea and will have been assumed to be complementary, the aggregation of wills, by markets and by governmental attempts to imitate
or create markets, has driven the argument.
'The economic approach to the environment this Article
uses to
organize environmental law has been criticized, notably by Professor Mark Sagoff. "Laws like the Endangered Species Act flout this
conception of economic efficiency. This is how most Americans
would have it: most Americans reject the notion that the natural
environment should be made over to serve the wants of the self173 This Article argues from Hobbes rather than from Aristotle or
Rousseau. To a large extent, as suggested in the Introduction, I have chosen
this approach because my argument is political. I have written in the tenor of
the times, rather than written from my own temperament. But under the
pressure of technology, the times they are a changin', and liberalism as
conceived in contemporary politics is insufficient to answer many pressing
questions of our day. See KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, supra note

155;

GROUNDWORK TO A METAPHYSIC OF

MORALS (1785);

MORALS (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (1797).

THE METAPHYSIC OF

Potential may lie in the Kant of

the Critique of Judgment, and, more generally, in aesthetics rather than in

practical morality. Hannah Arendt thought that judgment provided the
ground for a liberal political, as opposed to moral, philosophy. HANNAH
ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (Ronald Beiner ed.,
1982) (1972). Unfortunately, she died before the project could be completed.
With this in hand, the project is to broaden liberalism from its noble but
narrow reliance on the Critiqueof PracticalReason to a more expansive vision of
the mind. A good place to start, particularly for liberals, would be the Kantian
psychology writ large, i.e. to define liberalism in order to encompass the
Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason, and the Critique of
Judgment.
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interested consumer." 74 For Sagoff, economic analysis of environmental problems involves a category mistake. Economic arguments
begin by positing a market system that would value the commodity
in question. 175 But if the environment is a matter of public order as
opposed to private preference, the question is not how much will
consumers pay, but what kind of world citizens believe should exist.
By conflating public principle and private preferences, economic
argument renders individual choice a matter of comparative economic values, thereby making the political discussion of public
choice unnecessary.' 76 Liberal economics, taken to its extreme,
obviates liberal politics.
174 Mark Sagoff, Economic Theoy and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REv.
1393, 1396 (1981); see also MARK SACOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH (1988).
175 Methods of valuation vary, and even in the hypothetical cases usually
deployed in debates over the environment, methodological difference can
matter. The most important difference for environmental policy is the socalled offer-acceptance problem. Generally, the values obtained using a
model that measures a consumer's willingness to pay are often substantially
lower than the values obtained by a model which discusses a consumer's
willingness to accept change. Consumers are much less willing to buy an
entitlement (to make an offer) than they are to give up an entitlement they
already possess (to accept a deprivation). For instance, a canyon with
environmental importance that is useful for hydroelectric power generation

will be valued differently if consumers have to offer to pay the power company

not to build the dam, perhaps through recreational user fees, or if the power
company must pay the consumers in order to destroy the land. Facially
neutral

economic

arguments

thus

often

conceal

a

prejudice:

environmentalists will assume an asset, here the canyon, is in the public
domain, and will use acceptance costs to set a price on destruction, with the
result that the development will not take place. Conversely, those in favor of
development tend to argue as if the proposed developers already had the
entitlement, and environmental special interest groups were forced to
purchase the parcel. I assume that Sagoff disputes the validity of willingnessto-pay arguments because he is an environmentalist, and willingess-to-pay is

the mode of valuation most frequently profferred by his opponents in
environmental politics. See SACoor, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH, supra note
174, at 99-123.
Finally, note the offer-acceptance problem is independent of the
transaction cost problem discussed in relation to the Coase theorem. See supra
notes 74-76 and accompanying text (discussing Coase theorem). Discussions
of the Coase theorem elude the offer-acceptance problem by innocuously
assuming rational actors and perfect information as well as no transactional
costs.
176 As Sagoff notes:
An alternative-technocracy--quarantines or localizes conflict so
that it may be resolved by the application of some mechanical rule
or decision procedure. Cost-benefit approaches to public policy, if
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Sagoff's argument is powerful, but it does not explain contemporary environmental law, and does not organize environmental law
into a discipline. 17 At least five reasons support organizing environmental law with an essentially economic liberalism. First, as discussed above, centralized government has become less defensible.
The unconscious rationality of the market seems in many respects
superior to the efforts of conscious rationality. Markets are much
better than governments at organizing activities such as producing,
trading, and consuming, that do so much environmental harm, and
are therefore central to environmental law.
Second, environmental law and economic analysis have considerably more kinship than Sagoff allows. Technology is largely a product of market forces. Much environmental law may be
characterized as an attempt to articulate rules for the use of technology. In a capitalist society, technology is often used by commercial undertakings whose motivations are economically rational, and
who are therefore amenable to economic-based governance.
Third, liberalism is hesitant to analyze the presumptively autonomous individual. Even though the structure of liberal society, in
which each individual is both consumer and citizen, presumes that
people function differently in different situations, how they do so is
their business. 7 8 Therefore, neither markets nor elections are
taken to their extreme, would do this, and thus they would make
useless the institutions of democratic government. Cost-benefit
analysis localizes conflict among affected individuals and prevents
it from breaking open into the public realm. This suggests that
the reason that industry favors economic approaches to public
policy is not necessarily the obvious one, namely, that cost benefit
analysis is sensitive to the costs of regulation. The deeper reason
may be that cost-benefit analysis defines a framework that keeps
the public qua public and the citizen qua citizen out.
Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, supra note 174, at 1414-15.
177 Indeed, I agree with Sagoff as a speculative matter, but I disagree as a
practical matter. Sagoff's account cannot serve to inform an environmental
jurisprudence that can rationalize most of American environmental law. As a
normative matter, in a market society one cannot simply assert the supremacy
of non-market methods for ordering values. The current task for
environmental theory is to make Sagoff's desire for a multiplicity of political
methods available to a society in thrall to doctrinaire economic liberalism.
178 A more abstract version of the same argument: political liberalism holds
forth the moral ideal of the autonomous individual, capable of rational
choice. The moral responsibility of the liberal individual is to ignore her own
situation and make ethical decisions on a principled, that is, abstracted, basis.
Moral choice requires only a principled process of decision; the substance of
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likely to banish the other procedure as a mode of social choice.
Market arguments will always be available to criticize legislative
decisions, and one cannot simply assert - as Sagoff does - the
legitimacy of democratic processes in the face of market processes.
Sagoff's alternative, of defining an area of legislative politics distinct
from that of the market, would require defining the citizen qua citizen. This alternative would introduce an element of substantive
value into liberal autonomy, thereby corrupting the neutral process
on which liberalism stakes so much.179 From a liberal perspective,
therefore, the autonomous individual who participates in both liberal markets and elections cannot be defined in relation to the market or to the election, as merely an actor playing a role. The
individual must be treated as an independent self, the perpetual
recipient of both political and economic arguments.' 8 0
the choice is the liberal individual's own business. Autonomy, the ability to
choose, is therefore considered indivisible. See STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL
VIRTuEs 208-10 (1989) (arguing for the indivisible quality of autonomy). The
argument that autonomy is the basic principle of the system, and therefore
somewhat inscrutable from within the system is too simple. Autonomy is
actually a shorthand for a number of characteristics. The autonomous
individual, presumed by the Anglo-American liberal tradition since Hobbes, is
capable of consent. To consent, one must be at least rational, that is, in
possession of some capability to ratiocinate and to communicate. One must
also possess some sense of being distinct from others. Although these
distinctions seem only analytical, liberalism is unwilling to examine the
substance of autonomy in practice, because in practice, the analysis would be
into the substance of choice, and keeping the process of choice inviolate is the
central enterprise of liberal politics.
179 For example, one might argue that liberal participation through voting
requires that one be a "good" voter. Such an idea seems at best strange, and at
worst a way for the politically powerful to maintain their power by subjugating
the "bad" voters. As a matter of American legal history, voting requirements
have been made considerably more lax, due as much or more so to our history
of racial discrimination than to our theory of democracy. In the abstract,
ensuring that voters are informed and care about the community is not
inherently anti-democratic.
180 Despite the preceding two notes and the accompanying text, this is the
space in liberal argument various contemporary efforts, including my own, are
trying to develop, by basing political structure on a more nuanced theory of
consciousness, of social participation, and of political language. See supra note
155 and accompanying text; see also Sagoff, supra note 141, at 245-67
(describing a non-utilitarian rationale for preserving the environment). The
indivisibility of autonomy under current ideas of liberalism is one reason why
the United States has had problems with the interface between formal politics
and the market, for example, with election reforms laws that limit First
Amendment rights. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Fourth, Sagoff argues directly from the authority of democracy.
As discussed above, electoral politics is increasingly characterized in
market rhetoric. Interest groups negotiate for legal outcomes by
which they will prosper. Government is increasingly thought of as a
market. In this light, the outcome of Sagoff's democratic environmental argument is unclear. His example, the Endangered Species
Act, is vulnerable to attack as inherently illiberal. One can argue
that the Act is an illegitimate interference with the true collective
will of the people as revealed by the market."8 ' So the liberal
response to Sagoff's argument may be that the Act is legitimate as
the outcome of the democratic process, but a right-thinking
legisla82
ture would repeal, rather than reaffirm, the Act.'
Fifth and finally, as a matter of mechanics rather than ideology,
the competition between markets and legislatures as a mode of
public choice is canted in favor of markets. The claim that markets
should be the mode of choice in any particular conflict, such as that
over wetlands, is strongly voiced by the parties who stand to gain the
most. Most of the economic benefits of developing a wetland are
captured by a few people. The environmental benefits are far more
diffuse. Developers are therefore willing to expend huge amounts
of political capital to keep wetlands in the market, to minimize regulation, and so forth. In extreme cases, developers use political
arguments against the exercise of legislative power, contending that
their property rights have been taken by government interference.18 3 In general, environmental law is fought on the terrain of
economics.
181 Perhaps the attack on democratically liberal, but economically
irrational, laws such as the Endangered Species Act contains a deep premise
that property rights are prior to political rights. See generallyBLACKSTONE, supra
note 61.
182 Sagoff's argument depends on an idea that voting is different than
buying, and that public preference is different than private preference. This
idea is often derided as hypocritical, and as the basis for the free-rider
problem.
183 This argument is a strong claim in American politics. Claims brought
under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution have
received a great deal of attention from academics in the last few decades.
Because, theoretically at least, regulatory takings can be found
unconstitutional, takings claims occupy a definite niche in environmental law.
See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992);
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51 (1979); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), reh'g denied, 439
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Although these arguments may justify an economic approach to
organizing environmental law, they do not fully respond to Sagoff's
contention that economic argument ultimately precludes other
forms of political discourse. 1 84 Arguments should not simply assert
the priority of democratic politics, as Sagoff does, or of economics,
as arguments defining the problem in terms of real or imagined
markets do.' 85 Instead, it is necessary to construct political economy anew by asking when we should use markets or representative
politics to determine public choices regarding the environment.
Fortunately, the corpus of existing environmental law can be
organized without resolving this conflict. That is, a dualistic and
somewhat ill-resolved notion of liberalism can organize most of the
materials of environmental law. Principled resolution of the conflicts between markets and legislatures is necessary, however, to
complete liberal environmental jurisprudence, and to inform a
defensible environmental legislation.

U.S. 883 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Just v.
Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972); State v.Johnson, 265 A.2d 711
(Me. 1970).
A similar political argument-that governmental action interferes with the
national commitment to structure social arrangements through markets-is
made by litigation brought under the Commerce Clause of Article I of the
Constitution. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456
(1981), reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 1027 (1981); City of Philadelphia v. NewJersey,
437 U.S. 617 (1978); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Montana, 436 U.S.
371 (1978); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); Swin
Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990); Proctor and Gamble v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d.
69 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978; National Solid Waste
Management Ass'n v. Voinovich, 763 F. Supp. 244 (S.D. Ohio 1991), rev'd, 959
F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1992).
184 Sagoff's real concern is with substance, not process. He relies on most
Americans' sense that nature is worth something, and that this piety is more
easily expressed in legislatures than through markets. See Sagoff, Economic
Theory and Environmental Law, supra note 174, at 1414-18.

185 Commenting on the ubiquity of willingness-to-pay arguments, Sagoff
asks, "Why do economists believe that opinions that oppose theirs deserve a
price and not a reply?" Id. at 1418. After all, an economic argument's validity
is not assessed on the basis of its proponents' willingess to pay for them. By
valuing economic arguments more than environmental amenities, economists
imply that environmental arguments for non-monetizable values are mere
preferences, and hence should be priced.
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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AT THE BOUNDS OF LIBERALISM

A.

The Problem of Value

The ideal history explains the structure of environmental law in
terms of liberal ideology. Liberalism both explains and rationalizes
the majority of environmental law, and gives environmental law a
coherent, even defensible, structure. This structure will prove useful for instruction, and maybe for more thoughtful legislation.
Does liberalism adequately rationalize all environmental law?
Even statutes that undoubtedly realize liberal ends often seem to
speak of something beyond. As NEPA Section 2 illustrates:
The purposes of this Chapter are: To declare a national policy
which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between
man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the
health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to18the
6 Nation; and
to establish a Council on Environmental Quality.

It is difficult to include harmony or environmental damage as
goods within the intellectual framework of liberalism. Harms to the
environment, beyond the minimal level of environmental quality
necessary for people to remain autonomous, are goods external to
liberalism. The liberal may justify the environmental protection
sought by NEPA as an amenity obtained by the polity acting
through legitimate procedures, akin to spending tax money on a
civic center or some other permissible purpose. But there is no
liberal requirement for either the prevention of specific environmental harms nor the construction of a civic center. Without a substantive justification, the policy objectives set forth by NEPA are
merely publicly articulated preferences subject to change.
Even if the conflict between political and economic liberalism
can be resolved, liberal environmental jurisprudence must contend
with the limitations of liberalism itself. Critics charge that liberalism does not answer the question, what is good?" 7 Within their
spheres of autonomy, what should liberals choose? Liberal thought
is silent on this issue because individuals themselves should know
what is best for them. Liberalism does not maintain an idea of the
good; it presumes an autonomous individual who will-at some
186 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (emphasis added); 'see also Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1131-36; Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44.
187 For a review and bibliography, see LIBERALSM AND Is CRrncs (Michael
J. Sandel ed., 1984).
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future date-seek the good."' 8 The only liberal political task is to
protect the autonomy of the individual. Liberalism is thus devoted
to political process and the conditions of politics, rather than to the
conditions of life that politics should bring to pass.
Just as liberalism recognizes no good other than autonomy, liberal environmental law is restricted to harms that can be expressed
as reductions of autonomy. A hazardous waste site that leaches toxins into groundwater, thereby endangering human health and lowering property values, is such a harm. Regulating this site requires
no particularly environmental justification because hazardous waste
harms people. Hazardous waste law can be justified without reference to nature. Other concerns cannot be expressed as reductions
of autonomy, for instance preserving wilderness that few people will
ever see, and that many would like to exploit. A belief that there is
something sacrosanct about nature that requires legislation to prohibit drilling for oil near Alaska's Brooks Range is not based on a
liberal argument. Arguments based on nature explicitly rely on values that have nothing to do with autonomy, and that liberalism
characterizes (and dismisses for political purposes) as essentially
private. Insofar as liberalism is the dominant ideology, arguments
that place intrinsic value in nature do not sound and will not be
heard. l8 9
MichaelJ. Sandel, Introduction to LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITcs, supra note
187, at 4. "Now the commitment to a framework neutral among ends can be
seen as a kind of value-in this sense the Kantian liberal is no relativist-but
its value consists precisely in its refusal to affirm a preferred way of life or
188

conception of the good." Id.

189 The following is an example:
[M]ost Americans will pay marginally higher prices for petroleum
products if oil production is not allowed in the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge. Because this cost to each individual is low and the
costs of information and action are high relative to the benefits,
each person will rationally remain ignorant, that is, he will not become

informed on the issue. But organized groups that favor preserving
wildlife habitat in the pristine tundra can gain by stopping drilling
in the refuge. To the extent that those who benefit from wildlife
preservation do not have to pay the opportunity costs of forgone
energy production, they will demand "too much" wildlife habitat.
ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 121, at 15 (emphasis added). Free Market
Environmentalism serves as something of an interlocutor for this Article. It is
ideologically doctrinaire and explicit. Though I found more subtle deployments of economic arguments in environmental politics, I could not find
statements that pose the profound differences in outlook more clearly.
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As discussed above, environmental concerns in the context of liberalism are represented by proxies, whose claims are based not on
nature, but on reductions of individual autonomy. Environmental
law can be understood as a succession of attempts to square the
circle and phrase claims of the external environment within the
internal logic of liberalism. This Article now discusses a series of
attempts to avoid this problem altogether by phrasing environmental values within the potential framework derived from individual
autonomy, instead of phrasing the claims as reductions of individual autonomy.
B.

DoctrinalAttempts to Articulate Value: Public Trust and
Public Nuisance

The public trust doctrine bars actions that harm interests in the
environment held by the public as a whole. The doctrine is
ancient, with roots in Roman law: "By the law of nature, these
things are common to mankind: the air, running water, the sea,
and consequently the shores of the sea. . ."
Though long part
of U.S. law, the doctrine was renovated and put in the service of the
environmental movement by ProfessorJoseph Sax, who defined the
basis of public trusteeship.
The scattered evidence, taken together, suggests that the idea of a
public trusteeship rests upon three related principles. First, that
certain interests-like the air and the sea-have such importance
to the citizenry as a whole that it would be unwise to make them
the subject of private ownership. Second, that they partake so

much of the bounty of nature, rather than that of individual enterprise, that they should be made freely available to the entire citizenry without regard to economic status. And, finally, that it is a
principle purpose of government to promote the interests of the
general public rather than to redistribute public goods from broad
public uses to restricted private benefit. 19 1

190 J. INST. 2.1.1. Professor Joseph Sax has repeatedly cited this passage,
and so it has entered the mythos of the public trust doctrine. Little historical

work is entailed in the modern appropriation of Justinian for environmental
ends. I doubt this matters; since the time of Justinian, Roman law has
traditionally been used to justify the present, most notably in the nascence of
the Western legal tradition in the eleventh century. See generally HAROLD J.
BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION (1983).
191 JOSEPH

L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: ASTRATEGY FOR CITIZEN

ACTION 165 (1970). Professor Sax's writings on the environmental uses for the

public trust doctrine include: The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19
ENVrL. L. 473 (1989); Liberating the Public Trust Doctrinefrom Its Historical
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The public trust doctrine has been used to protect the public
interest in the environment against three types of abuse: alienation,
diversion, and degradation. 19 2 Alienation is the transfer of public
wealth to private hands.19 Diversion is the transfer of control of
environmental resources within the government but apart from the
interests of the governed.' 9 4 The injunctive relief offered by the
courts for cases of alienation and diversion can be understood as
limitations on the abuse of government power. This explanation
fits easily within liberal process concerns and ultimately provides a
guarantee of individual autonomy.19 5 Degradation is different. In
a number of public trust cases the court did not base its remedy on
abuse of government process, but rather on a basic commitment of
government to preserve certain aspects of the environment. At
least in degradation cases, the public trust doctrine is essentially
substantive, and therefore cannot be justified by the liberal commitment to process. 19 6
Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 185 (1980); The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970).

The federal government did not, for the most part, retain title to Western
water. Yet under the reserved fights doctrine, when Congress dedicated
public lands to a particular purpose, such as an Indian reservation, a national
monument, or a national forest, it reserved adequate water to accomplish that
purpose. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
See generally Bruce Babbitt, The Public Interest in Western Water, 23 EsvTL. L. 933
(1993); Symposium on the Public Trust and the Waters of the American West, 19
ENVTL. L.
192 In

421-735 (1989).
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 191,

Professor Sax discussed the public trust doctrine in terms of alienation and
diversion. Degradation is my own term, adopted for rhetorical reasons. See
PLATER ET AL., supra note 9, at 405 (speaking of resource defense or
derogation, terms that imply a political standard legitimately adopted and
judicially enforced through public trust doctrine). Whatever the public trust
doctrine is enforcing, it is not a clear standard. The impulse behind public
trust is an ill-defined substantive value in nature.
193 See, e.g., Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), affd, 154
U.S. 225 (1894).
194 See, e.g., Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass.
1966).
195 Sax does just this in his discussions of Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 387,
and Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 114. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resource Law, supra note 191, at 489-509.
196 See In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980); Sierra
Club v. Department of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975); National
Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (en banc), cert.
denied sub nom. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. National
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What interests in the environment are covered by the public trust
doctrine? Water has traditionally been the stronghold of the public
trust doctrine, 197 but parks are now also considered within the public trust,1 9 as is wildlife."' How the public trust doctrine applies to
the disposition of federal lands is unclear." ° The public trust doctrine also applies to assets controlled by government in a proprietary, rather than a governmental capacity. 20 ' The public trust
Audubon Soc'y, 464 U.S. 977. In such cases, the court "is analytically focused
on defense of the quality of the resource against derogation rather than
protecting the character of ownership. Emperor Justinian, remember, began
his list of public trust resources with air, for which issues of ownership are
irrelevant, but issues of quality essential." PLATER ET AL., supra note 9, at 405.
197 See, e.g., Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 387. Water law interacts in subtle
ways with the doctrine of public trust. Regarding navigable waters, the United
States government enjoys extensive powers. See United States v. Rands, 389
U.S. 121 (1967) (discussing rights over navigable waters in terms similar to
public trust). Two other areas of water law that bear on the public trust are
water rights in the arid West and beach access. See DAVID J. BROWER, ACcESS
TO THE NATION'S BEACHES: LEGAL AND PLANNING PERSPECTrIVES (1978); JOSEPH
L. SAX

&

ROBERT

H.

ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES

(1986);

Note, Public Trust Doctrine-BeachAccess, 15 SETON HALL L. REv. 344 (1985).
198 See, e.g., Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 263 N.E.2d 11 (111. 1970).
199 See, e.g., In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980)
(concerning wildlife); Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284
(N.D. Cal. 1975) (concerning trees).
The literature on the scope of the public trust doctrine in environmental
law is growing. See Scott W. Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is it Amphibious, 1
J. ENvTL. L. & LITIG. 107 (1986); Alison Rieser, EcologicalPreservationas a Public
PropertyRight: An EmergingDoctrinein Search of a Theory, 15 HARV. ENvrL. L. REv.
393 (1991).
200 See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911) ("'All the public
lands of the nation are held in trust for the people of the whole country.' And
it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be administered. That is for
Congress to determine.") (quoting United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking
Co., 137 U.S. 160, 170 (1890)). More recently, lower federal courts have
argued that the federal government is judicially accountable for violations of
the public trust. See United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land Situated in City of
Boston, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981); In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F.
Supp. at 40. The public trust doctrine has been more vital on the state level,
an observation reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988), reh'g denied, 486 U.S. 1018. Perhaps the
public trust doctrine should be understood as an ownership issue, and hence
primarily, if not exclusively, a matter of state common law. This position,
however, leaves ill-defined the question of the disposition of federal lands.
201 E.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.
1983) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water &
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doctrine can be used in numerous areas, but its principles and contours remain unclear.
At a minimum, however, the modern public trust doctrine
reflects the contemporary understanding of property as a bundle of
rights tied together by socially reasonable expectations. In a society
with pervasive environmental law, it would be unreasonable for government agencies to assert, without more, that developmental policies are automatically in the public interest, whether carried out by
private actors (alienation) or governmental organs (diversion). It
would also be unreasonable for private actors not to recognize that
their use of their own property is constrained by prior, and public,
expectations of their behavior.2 °2 At this point, public trust doctrine shares much with modern takings doctrine, which maintains
that reasonable private property holders form their ownership
expectations in light of substantial government activity, and therefore are not harmed unfairly by foreseeable state activities that may
devalue their property.20 3
Whereas takings questions challenge the organization of governance, citizenship, and property by focusing on the nature of property, the public trust doctrine focuses on the nature of government.
The language of the public trust suggests that government is a fiduciary. Government thus has a benevolent but controlling duty
toward environmental interests held by the beneficiary, the public.
This avuncular image of government is in profound tension with
other conceptions of government. The role of a fiduciary government is different from a representative government, as an expres-

Power v. National Audubon Soc'y, 464 U.S. 977. The City of Los Angeles held
water rights as a proprietor rather than in its capacity as a government. Id.
202 See, e.g., State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
203 Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, supra
note 191, at 188.
The central idea of the public trust is preventing the destabilizing
disappointment of expectations held in common but without
formal recognition such as title. The function of the public trust
as a legal doctrine is to protect such public expectations against
destabilizing changes, just as we protect conventional private
property from such changes.
Id. (footnotes omitted). In a footnote, Sax discusses the relationship between
takings doctrine and Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978). Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrinefrom Its HistoricalShackles, supra
note 191, at 188 n.13.
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sion or perhaps agent"°4 of the collective will of the people, and
different yet again from the image of regulatory government discussed in Section III as the aggregate expression of private interests. Perhaps most importantly in this context, the idea that the
government holds environmental goods in the interest of the governed is simply antagonistic to the idea that the government is a
proprietor over its own lands. When should one image of govern20
ment be normative, and when should another?
Modern environmental law raises the same questions about public trust in a different way. If public ends may be pursued through
the creation of markets, and if privatization is therefore a way to
govern, which things should be kept in the public domain? This
conflict is not between private rights and (opposed) public interests, but rather among a variety of ways to attain public ends. From
the perspective of modern environmental law, the appropriate distribution and allocation of natural resources is a public end, and
markets are a good way to achieve that end. Markets require private property. Therefore the environmental assets in question
ought to be privatized and distributed by a market. Like the public
trust doctrine, markets can be justified as in the public interest.
Conceivably, the nation's public lands would be better used if they
were all distributed to the private market. 20 6 Without more, it is
unclear which things should be considered in the public trust, and
which should be handled through some other method of public
choice. More generally, a mature doctrine of public trust will have
to organize central relationships among government, individuals,
and things, and will therefore have to confront the liberal values
entrenched in American law and institutions. The doctrine of public trust thus begins by imposing a substantive responsibility to

204 "Perhaps agent" is a nod to Ackerman's theory of dualist democracy.
Ackerman expresses the modest hope that ordinary democracy exists some of
the time, while the rest of the time authorities rule using authority legitimated
by our last act of public will, our last constitutional moment. See AcKERxMuIAN,
supra note 62, at 3-33.
205 This would not have been a difficult problem for Emperor Justinian,
but it is a bit more difficult if the legitimacy of government rests on the
consent of the people.
206 Such questions are becoming familiar in sectors other than the
environment. If the telephone services should be distributed by private
markets, why should the postal service be run by the government?
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respect certain environmental values, and ends by reformulating
core questions of liberal governance. 0 7
The doctrine of public nuisance similarly positions the state as
guarantor of certain widely held rights. A public nuisance is "a condition dangerous to health, offensive to community moral standards, or unlawfully obstructing the public in the free use of public
20
property."'
The doctrine of public nuisance covers rights that are
justified in liberal terms, such as health and the enjoyment of property. In this light, public nuisance is a judicial aggregation of private harms, and essentially similar to regulation.
As with public trust, public nuisance contains more than the liberal framework can easily defend. "[Public nuisance] is one affecting rights enjoyed by citizens as part of the public and must affect a
considerable number of people or an entire community or neighborhood."2 ' Even though the doctrine of public nuisance may create a private right of action, a public nuisance complaint is based
on a right enjoyed by citizens as members of the public and not as
private citizens. "In typical public nuisance actions, public prosecutors bring lawsuits seeking injunctions to force cessation of nuisances (often preferring the tort approach even where statutory
remedies apply)."21° Procedurally, this tends to relieve plaintiffs,
whether private individuals or public prosecutors, of the obligation
to show monetary damages to their estate, and thus makes the
court's traditional remedy of ordering abatement of the activity
more available. 2 1 ' Theoretically, the harm is approached as a public matter, not as the resolution of a conflict between neighbors.
In this light, public nuisance is similar to criminal law. Both
crimes and public nuisances constitute a violation of the public
2 12
order itself, regardless of any monetary injury done to the victim.
207 See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in NaturalResource Law, supra note 191;
Liberating the Public Trust Doctrinefrom Its HistoricalShackles, supra note 191.
208 BLAcK's LAw DICnONARY 1230 (6th ed. 1990).
209 Id. (citing Spur Indus. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 705 (Ariz.
1972)).
210 PLAR ET AL., supra note 9, at 122; see also New York v. Schenectady
Chemicals, Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1983) (upholding state nuisance cause of
action but not statutory cause of action).
211 The economically-minded liberal may ask why injunctive rather than
monetary relief is appropriate. As noted, supra note 175, injunctive relief can
serve as a hybrid, a regulatory action taken by an adjudicative institution.
212 The association is historical as well as conceptual. "Public nuisance,
quite unlike private nuisance, is descended from criminal offenses against the
public peace. Over time public nuisance became a civil action as well,
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Like criminal law, public nuisance adjudication resolves conflicts
between the order of civil society, represented by the state, and one
who has transgressed that order, and only incidentally resolves conflict among actors within civil society.
This would pose no problem for liberal theory if the harms
treated under public nuisance could be easily characterized as
harms to the individual, as with criminal law. But the gravamen of a
public nuisance complaint often cannot be so characterized, and
therefore may not be justifiable within liberalism. For example,
public nuisances that are violations of "community moral standards" presuppose the existence of substantive community moral
standards, such as those regarding prostitution or pornography.
These goods may not be justified on liberal grounds at all, but are
instead collective goods held by the community. The classic public
nuisance case, Spur Industries, rested in part on the uncontroversial,
but nonetheless illiberal, public reprobation toward swarms of
3
flies.

21

Such consensus is the exception rather than the rule. The nearly
sacrosanct quality of private property is deeply embedded in American legal culture. Particularly when the government has not
advanced a commercial justification for its actions, that is, has not
argued that the law is justified in the market terms that underwrite
the ideal history of environmental law, legal protection of values in
nature are continually vulnerable to challenge as unjustifiable
within the liberal framework. Most dramatically, the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution limits the
extent to which collective value may trump the property rights guaranteed by the liberal order. Even regulation justified by market failure, such as RCRA, may be so intrusive in application as to
constitute a regulatory or even a physical taking. 2 14 The emergence
of illiberal values, such as a substantive value in nature, within the
2 15
context of liberal law is thus incessantly problematic.

providing remedies for violations of public rights." PLATER ET

AL., supra note
9, at 122.
213 Spur Indus., 494 P.2d at 705.
214 See Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
215 Most contemporary environmental law textbooks now provide a fairly
substantial discussion of takings doctrine. See generally cases cited supra note
183.
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IntergenerationalEquity

The argument known as intergenerational equity is the leading
attempt to render substantive values in nature defensible within the
framework of the liberal political order. The core of the argument
is contained in the proverb: "We have not inherited the earth from
our parents; we have borrowed it from our children." Because each
generation is only one generation among many, this argument
holds that the obligations of each generation to humanity extend
across generations. Consequently, political decisions made in the
present generation must consider the well-being of future generations. Because humanity depends on the environment, all current
decisions should be made with a view to the long-term impact on
the environment.
To define intergenerational equity, it is useful to view the
human community as a partnership among all generations. In
describing a state as a partnership, Edmund Burke observed that
"as the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many
generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who
are living but between those who are living, those who are dead,
and those who are to be born." The purpose of human society
must be to realize and protect the welfare and well-being of every
generation. This requires sustaining the life-support systems of the
planet, the ecological processes and the environmental conditions
necessary for a healthy and decent human environment.
In this partnership, no generation knows beforehand when it
will be the living generation, how many members it will have, or
even how many generations there will ultimately be. It is useful,
then, to take the perspective of a generation that is placed somewhere along the spectrum of time, but does not know in advance
where it will be located. Such a generation would want to inherit
the earth in at least as good condition as it has been in for any
previous generation and to have as good access to it as previous
generations. This requires each generation to pass the planet on
in no worse condition than it received it in and to provide equitable access to its resources and benefits. Each generation is thus
both a trustee for the planet with obliations to care for it and a
beneficiary with rights to use it .. .

Intergenerational equity appears to fit squarely within liberalism.
At its heart, intergenerational equity is a theory of process failure.
When the interests of future generations are not considered, the
policy of the present generation will be skewed toward the shortterm interests of the living. The living will be prejudiced against
216 Edith B. Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generationsfor the
Environment 84 AM.J. INT'L L. 198, 200 (1990).
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the unborn. The current generation will be illiberally inclined to
undervalue the interests of other morally equal beings in future
generations, in favor of their own interests. To correct this injustice, the liberally-principled actor should draw on Rawls' imagery of
the original position and act as if he could not know when he would
be born.2 17 Environmental decisions made through this lens will
avoid prejudice. Under the theory of intergenerational equity,
future generations will be virtually represented by the moral concern of the current generation. Remedying the process failure
inherent in history requires a conceptual grant of the franchise to
unborn generations."18 Here, the true liberal polity treats all autonomous beings equally, whether or not they have yet been born, and
therefore must consider the interests of unborn generations as if
they could vote or buy.2 19
Closer examination of this argument reveals many problems and
some successes. Kant's categorical imperative, reflected in Rawls'
metaphor of the original position, relies on a distinction between
217 See RAwLS,
supra note 117, at 288. Rawls himself discusses
intergenerational equity in terms of savings.
Since no one knows to which generation he belongs, the question
is viewed from the standpoint of each and a fair accommodation is
expressed by the principle adopted. All generations are virtually
represented in the original position, since the same principle
would always be chosen. An ideally democratic decision will result,
one that is fairly adjusted to the claims of each generation and
therefore satisfying the precept that what touches all concerns all.
Moreover, it is immediately obvious that every generation, except
possibly the first, gains when a reasonable rate of savings is
maintained. The process of accumulation, once it is begun and
carried through, is to the good of all subsequent generations.
Each passes on to the next a fair equivalent in real capital as
defined by a just savings principle. (It should be kept in mind
here that capital is not only factories and machines, and so on, but
also the knowledge and culture, as well as the techniques and
skills, that make possible just institutions and the fair value of
liberty.)
Id.
218 This is hardly unproblematic. If we assume the normal rule of
representation, one autonomous individual one vote, the number of proxy
votes, those of the unborn individuals, far outstrips the actual participants in
any given election. How, then, will conflicts be decided? On a winner take all
basis, with the future inevitably winning?
219 Because so many environmental decisions are made through markets,
rather than legislatures, the relative weight of these future interests arises.
Future value is usually discounted, a problem discussed in some detail below.
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right and circumstance. Without undue simplification, the distinction here is familiar to lawyers as the difference between civil rights
and social rights. Civil rights can be deduced from the categorical
imperative. These claims are grounded in individual autonomy
irrespective of its physical circumstances.22 ° Social rights, and most
environmental claims, are grounded in physical circumstances.
The relationship between autonomous individuals and physical circumstances is not one of right, but one of value. 2 2 '
The first problem with the intergenerational equity argument is
that many of the "equities" the argument protects cannot be justified as rights.2 22 A principled decisionmaker could distribute goods
in an equitable manner, but which environmental amenities are
recognized as goods? If values change, to what extent does an environmental element need to be protected? To what extent can we
impose our present values on future generations? How do we
weigh future environmental amenities against current needs, or
future needs, for example for food, against current amenities?
Should we preserve land, so that it can be plowed under later? Or
develop it now, thereby increasing present welfare, and leaving
future generations with a greater capital stock with which to confront hunger? How are we to decide among the "machines," "culture," and "techniques," that Rawls argues constitute a civilization's
capital, a list to which we might add clear water and rare and beautiful animals? How can a present government official begin to determine, much less decide on, the preferences of a future generation?
These questions are not simply difficult, but are unanswerable
within the abstract framework of the categorical imperative. To
answer these questions, one must know more about the situation at
hand. Rawls plugs the holes in his argument with sympathetic, but
highly located, imagery.
In attempting to estimate the fair rate of saving the persons in the
original position ask what is reasonable for members of adjacent
generations to expect of one another at each level of advance.
220 A similar notion of rights underpins John Hart Ely's theory of judicial
review for the purpose of reinforcing democratic rights. See JOHN H. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
221 See KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note

(1980).

86.
222 Equity once meant conscience, and was to be distinguished from right,
as chancery was to be distinguished from law. This distinction seems fruitful
to me, but, unfortunately, I have never heard it made in discussions of
intergenerational equity, which are usually based on an atemporal theory of
rights.
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They try to piece together ajust savings schedule by balancing how
much at each stage they would be willing to save for their immediate descendants against what they would feel entitled to claim of
their immediate predecessors. Thus imagining themselves to be
fathers, say, they are to ascertain how much they should set aside
for their sons by noting what22they
would believe themselves enti3
tled to claim of their fathers.
The claim of sons upon fathers presumes that one is preconfigured
and constrained by one's role and obligations. Fathers and sons are
anything but autonomous in the sense of Rawls' original position

because they are prejudiced by personal circumstance. Perhaps
questions that affect posterity should be decided by reference to
our experience, but these arguments can not be based on the lib224
eral ideal of justice that Rawls espouses and develops.
If this set of problems were to be resolved, an even more difficult
set of problems would arise. The categorical imperative requires us
223 RAWLS, supra note 117, at 289.
224 I do not know why Rawls attempts to make the argument from the

categorical imperative carry loads for which it was not designed. Kant himself
is quite explicit about the abstracted nature of his argument, which concerns
the morality to be followed by a rational will irrespective of material
circumstances. (One might argue that the prescriptions reached by Kant are
too specific. He often imports prejudices that cannot be deduced from the
nature of rationality, but which instead reflect his opinion, religion,
experience, or other personal aspect.) The direction of Kant's argument is
clear: to what extent can a morality be established without reference to the

particular circumstances of human life, to what I here call location? The
prescriptions of such a morality are rights, or more correctly in contemporary
language, basic human (civil) rights. But it seems obvious that an articulation
of rights cannot hope to specify much of practical life. The project of
specification-including the distribution of goods-is left largely to legal and
political institutions, and simply does not flow from the theoretical argument.
I do not know why Rawls begins a theoretical argument that he must know is
doomed. Perhaps he felt that (i) in the late sixties and early seventies a
philosophical theory ofjustice had practical prescriptions to offer for political
life, and (ii) utilitarian thought had made questions of the just distribution of
goods unavoidable, even if it had done little to answer them. Rawls has since
conceeded that justice as fairness is ultimately a political prescription, not a
metaphysical position. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:Political,Not Metaphysical,

14 J. PHIL. & PUB. AFr.

223 (1985).

Unfortunately, the strength of the

argument from the original position is metaphysical and most compelling in

conditions of widespread disagreement on the substance of the good, when
neutral process, a regime of rights, and the other formal accoutrements of a
liberal regime are most needed. Even in its political guise, however, Rawlsian
pluralism replicates, rather than solves, the problem of liberal environmental
law.

706

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 27:619

to choose a mode of decision principled by the recognition of
autonomy. We fulfill the categorical imperative by treating each
rational being as an end rather than as a means to another end. In
so doing, we define ourselves as autonomous-capable of constraining ourselves-and enter the kingdom of ends. In the king-

dom of ends, a rational person would choose to institute regular
modes of public choice, that is, liberal democratic politics and liberal markets. The Kantian argument of intergenerational equity
thus returns to the conflict among different but equally legitimate
modes of public choice. But as argued throughout this Article,
those modes of public decision ultimately fail to capture environmental concerns. 22 5 An intergenerational equity argument fails to
escape the constraints of the liberalism on which it is premised.
The argument for intergenerational equity is also proposed as a
grammar of choice between liberal modes of public decision. This
argument holds that environmentally destructive short-term behavior associated with markets is unfair, and therefore legislatures, not
markets, should be used to make decisions about the environment.
But a post hoc economic justification exists for virtually any marketbased decision. 226 Assuming a well-functioning market, an
225 Kant developed the categorical imperative as a response to the problem
of determining the morally or legally legitimate constraint of the will. Kant
attempted to make a principled argument that what we ought to do is different
from what we want to do. Typically, the categorical imperative is discusssed in
terms of a straightforward question: does obligation exist? The categorical
imperative is thus primarily a theory of decision, not of design. The
categorical imperative can be used for certain general questions of design,
most notably, to determine the existence and rough outline of both the state
and the laws. But it is difficult to argue that one should spend more or less
money on a certain project on Kantian grounds. Future generations do not
have an articulable claim to any particular policy. See supra note 218.
226 For example:
This does not mean that private entrepreneurs made no mistakes.
The Kingston Plains offers a pointed example. Unlike most land
in the Great Lakes area, which is now productive farmland,
timberland, or recreational land for fisherman, hunters, and
hikers, the Kingston Plains has never recovered from logging done
a hundred years ago. Efforts have been made to replant the area,
but the soil is too infertile and sandy. It took hundreds of years for
the original forest to grow, and it will take hundreds of years for
the area to recover. This does not imply, however, that cutting the
trees was a bad decision. When the trees were cut, good timber
stands in the Great Lakes area were selling for around $20 per
acre. In order to determine whether it would have made more
sense to invest in trees by foregoing the harvest, we must consider
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entreprenurial mistake would involve activities that were of higher
cost than their societal benefits, and would be quickly corrected by
the market. Therefore, in a well-functioning market, sustained mistakes appear to be impossible. While few environmentalists are viscerally convinced, the Panglossian quality of economic argument
makes it difficult to confront such reasoning without a theory of
public choice that accounts for both intergenerational equity and
the intergenerational valuation of goods. Liberal valuations of
intergenerational equity do not escape
the self-justifying quality of
2 27
equally liberal economic arguments.
What has the argument from intergenerational equity added to
the debate? First, intergenerational equity presents a persuasive
argument to liberals that the interests of future generations should
be taken into account. Second, like the substantively environmental laws and doctrines considered at the beginning of this Section,
and like the question of political grammar raised in the preceding
Section, intergenerational equity presents the need for an expressly
political organization of not only markets and legislatures, but of
the various levels of centralized and decentralized decisional
the return on other investments. Had the income from selling
these trees been invested in bonds or some other form of savings
at the time, it would now be worth approximately $110,000 per
acre, or $2.8 billion for the forty square miles. If the trees at
Kingston Plains had been left standing, would the benefits derived
over the past one hundred years from preserving land for wildlife
habitat, hiking, and other environmental amenities have been
worth foregoing the benefits society received from logging? The
answer is highly subjective, but the tremendous benefits from
exploiting the Kingston Plains cannot be ignored. Because the
land in this area is not worth anything close to this, we must infer
that harvesting the trees was the correct choice.
ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 121, at 47.
It is not obvious how entrepreneurs could make mistakes. Upon reflection,
however, this argument is hardly air-tight, even within the terms of economic
debate. The major problems concern the legitimacy of comparing the present
value of a sum of money, compounded over time, with the asset not traded
into value. Given the appropriate discount rate and enough time, the sale of
Manhattan appears sensible.
227 Counterarguments may be made within liberalism, by arguing some
form of market failure, or outside liberalism, by introducing some substantive
notion of the good. In practice, the first approach is difficult to maintain
without a great deal of knowledge about a particular situation or some
dramatic externalities. Without these, existing markets are presumed to be
reasonably well-functioning. Liberalism dismisses the second approach as
mere opinion.
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processes that make up modem public choice. Third, and most
importantly, intergenerational equity makes the inadequacies of liberal environmental jurisprudence painfully clear.
CONCLUSION: LIBERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw's POTENTIAL

As we have seen, liberalism can organize the materials of environmental law. Environmental law can be understood as a series of
attempts to phrase concern for the context of human life in a political philosophy grounded on individual choice. Philosophy's failure is law's gain. The antithesis between a substantive concern for
nature and the core commitment to individual autonomy requires
liberal environmental jurisprudence to run the gamut of liberalism's legitimating devices. Liberal environmental jurisprudence
thereby gains the somewhat circular but highly defensible theoretical power of contemporary liberal theory. Environmental law is
now a discipline.
Liberal environmental law raises the choices among liberally
legitimate processes that are central to contemporary liberal political theory. Most fundamentally, which environmental issues
should be devoted to markets, and which to legislatures? Through
its insistence on the political nature of markets, liberal environmental law is far more interventionist than environmental law has been
to date. Modem governance is about the construction of true markets that serve as reasonably accurate mechanisms of public choice,
rather than about the management of markets imagined to be natural. If governance takes place through markets, then environmental considerations do not compete with marketplace values such as
material prosperity. Material prosperity can only be assessed with a
view to the costs and benefits mediated by the environment. Environmental law thus becomes a sine qua non of modern governance,
and of behavior in the modem marketplace.
The idea of nature protected by environmental law fades over the
ideal history of environmental law. Archaic environmental law renders nature peripheral by considering it only where it is accompanied by a legally cognizable infringement on individual autonomy.
Classical environmental law makes nature extraneous to social
organization by replacing it with an aggregation of private interests,
that is, by treating nature as the common from which wealth is
extracted, and into which the noxious by-products of wealth-producing activities are dumped. For modern environmental law,
nature is primarily a notional presence, affiliated with recreation,
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religion, and other forms of private meaning that the state should
foster.
Throughout much of American history, some have called for a
substantive ideal of nature. These voices have been both literary,
starting with Thoreau, and political, with the founding of the Sierra
Club. They have also had their moments in the law. Environmental law has reflected substantive notions of nature intermittently
from the preservationist struggles of the nineteenth century to laws
such as the Endangered Species Act and doctrines such as public
trust and intergenerational equity. In the United States, however,
where liberal political economy is the dominant political theory,
these arguments are vulnerable to attacks on their political legitimacy. The preservationist impulse therefore informs environmental critique, inspires legislators, but only very rarely makes law. The
established legal regime that controls the environment springs
instead from a liberal ideology that does not countenance the idea
of substantive value located outside the individual.
At the same time, it seems unlikely that the preservationist
impulse will be extinguished altogether. Assuming that the United
States remains a liberal polity, and assuming it recognizes environmental law as an expression of its deepest ideological commitments, what will environmental law look like? Will any element of
nature be treated as sacrosanct, and if so, where will the polity set
the bounds of human activity? Practically, these questions boil
down to issues such as how clean the air will be, what species will be
preserved from extinction, and the other familiar problems and priorities of environmental management. Does liberal environmental
jurisprudence have anything principled to say about these
processes, or are they merely matters of interest-group struggle?
Liberal polities by definition set bounds to human activity and
erect cultural edifices designed to last forever. The commitment to
individual autonomy, secured by a regime of rights, limits both the
power of the state and provides the generations of citizens required
for the perpetual survival of liberal democratic society. Institutions
such as the tax code, the criminal law, and the military provide liberal polities with the means to ensure the continuity of the state, to
which citizens entrust the responsibility for the indefinite maintenance of the liberal order. These commitments, however, can plausibly be drawn from the nature of the liberal order itself. The
preservation of autonomy requires a state, a system of laws, and so
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forth.2 2 The environment is different. It may be possible, in Kantian fashion, to use our common commitments to liberalism to
deduce our general obligation to protect the environment for
future generations to inhabit. But a fine-grained vision of nature
that tells us whether or not our descendants will see spotted owls
and elephants cannot be deduced from the liberal order.
For all its persuasive power and intellectual elegance, liberalism
has little to say about our encounter with the world. Liberalism
looks inward to the will, and not outward to the context of human
activity. The soul of liberalism is a retreat from the world, a denial
that humans can ever discern the truth or agree on the good amidst
the chaos of life, and an attempt to build order out of consent and
the satisfaction of individual wills. To speak of nature is to discuss
both the purpose and the bounds of humanity; liberalism eschews
teleology and cannot rationalize its bounds. Environmental law
invites a more transcendent vision of politics by demanding a substantive vision of nature, and hence reverence in human conduct
toward nature. Thus environmental law and liberalism treat different modes of human political experience.
The differences in these discourses is important because liberal
political economy and environmental law now often discuss the
same things. The relation between humans and their world that
preoccupies environmental law, the imposition of technology,
increasingly requires the reordering of our social arrangements. In
order to survive as an ideology, liberalism must account for this
restructuring of societal arrangements. Liberal society is thus
increasingly forced to confront its own potential for self-transformation. Liberal society remakes the world in which choice occurs,
thereby constraining the context and the substance of choice, and
so vitiating its own legitimacy. Liberal environmental law is also a
response to this crisis of liberalism: a series of attempts to legitimate
the social transformations wrought by technology.
Environmental law forces liberal theory to ask after the future. In
doing so, the liberal must confront questions of purpose and context-questions whose answers entail a conception of nature-that
cannot be resolved within liberalism. In a world undergoing technological transformation, realization of both the social ideals of liberalism and the ideals that environmentalists hold dear requires a
228 This indeed is the project of Kant's The Metaphysics of Morals. KANT,
supra note 86.
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political discourse more comprehensive than contemporary liberalism, a discourse that can articulate the future.
That discourse remains on the horizon. To date, contemporary
liberal ideology has tried to appropriate the essentially religious
implications of the concept of nature as either personal preference,
and hence of highly limited importance for politics, or as objective
truth, certified by the new science, and hence profoundly alienated
from individual experience. Liberal environmental law thus
marginalizes openly environmental concerns. This awareness of
marginalization, of having one's beliefs rendered irrelevant, provides the heat in environmental law classes over such apparently dry
topics as cost/benefit analysis, risk assessment, preservation of
endangered species, and so forth. The concerns, however, are
durable, if they were not, environmental law would not be the burgeoning field it is.2 29 In Viclev Havel's words:
To me, personally, the smokestack soiling the heavens is not just a
regrettable lapse of a technology that failed to include "the ecological factor" in its calculation, one which can be corrected easily
with the appropriate filter. To me it is more the symbol of an age
which seeks to transcend the boundaries of the natural world and

its norms and to make it into a merely private concern, a matter of
subjective preference and private feeling, of the illusions,
prejudices and whims of a "mere" individual .....
The reality, I believe, is unfortunately more serious. The chimney "soiling the heavens" is not just a technologically corrigible
design error, or a tax paid for a better tomorrow, but a symbol of a
civilization which has renounced the Absolute,
which ignores the
230
natural world and disdains its imperatives.
A vision of nature adequate to inform environmental jurisprudence
would have to account for the way we understand nature in our
lives, and the way we understand ourselves in nature. Articulating
and reaching an understanding of nature-and hence of the possibilities of humanity-would transform politics. This indeed is
Havel's hope, that we "succeed in reconstituting the natural world
as the true terrain of politics." 2 1 If we were to achieve this dream,
if our legislation were the product of a politics in which humanity
understood its location, environmental law would be substantively
complete. Rendering our encounter with the world humane will
229 Perhaps if I were a true Hegelian, and believed I had seen the future, I
would say "discipline" instead of "field."
230 Viclav Havel, Anti-PoliticalPolitics, in CIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE 381,
383, 389 (John Keane ed., 1988).
231 Id. at 392.
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require this polity to decide on a dream of the beautiful, and the
springs of that consensus lie beyond the liberal ken.

